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IT'S 1996: DO YOU KNOW WHERE
YOUR CYBERKIDS ARE? CAPTIVE
AUDIENCES AND CONTENT
REGULATION ON THE INTERNET
I suspect, however, that it may come as a surprise to many people who
have not followed the evolution of constitutional law that, by implication at least, the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech unless that law advances a compelling governmental interest. Our cherished freedom of speech does
not cover as broad a spectrum as one may have gleaned from a simple
reading of the Amendment.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the advent of a novel communications technology has
fostered public apprehension of the harmful effects the medium's content
may have on children. 2 In the early part of the twentieth century, the
release of D.W. Griffith's theatrical film, The Birth of a Nation, literally
shocked a nation. 3 The viewing public, with the support of both federal
and state governments, responded to the fim's release with a tirade of
attempts to censor content deemed especially harmful for children and
1. Statement from Judge Buckwalter, one of three judges appointed to the panel
which heard arguments on plaintiffs' request that the court enjoin enforcement of particular provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 858 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (concurring opinion) (order granting preliminary injunction).
2. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 748 (1978)
(radio monologue); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) ("dial-a-porn" telephone message network). See also Allen S.
Hammond, IV, Indecent Proposals: Reason, Restraint and Responsibility in the Regulation
Of Indecency, 3 VnL. SpoRrs & ENr. L.J. 259, 293 n.l1 (1996) (noting "current criticism of
rap music is viewed from the historic vantage point of recurring cultural censorship" analogous to the Roaring '20s when "parents feared that jazz would erode the morals of their
children").
3. Based on Thomas Dixon Jr.'s novel, The Clansman, the film was the first to address the role of African Americans in American history. EDWARD DE GRAzIA & ROGER K.
NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS 3 (1982) (presenting an historical and legal record of movie censorship in the United States by officials and courts for political, religious, moral, and sexual
reasons).
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immigrants. 4 Griffith, however, believed that this new form of cultural
expression should be accorded the same constitutional status as the
print media:
Today the censorship of moving pictures through the entire country is
seriously harming the growth of art. Had intelligent opposition to censorship been employed when it first made itself manifest it could easily
have been overcome. But the pygmy child of that day has grown to be,
not merely a man, but a giant, and... he is a giant whose forces of evil
are so strong that he threatens the priceless heritage of our nationfreedom of expression. 5
The debate, which took several decades to resolve, resulted in the
film industry's voluntary movie rating system, one of the most effective
private efforts at content self-regulation undertaken by industry leaders
in a communications medium. 6
4. Subsequent to the film's release, Dixon persuaded Supreme Court Chief Justice
Edward Douglas White, a former Ku Klux Klan member, along with the other Supreme
Court Justices and members of Congress, to view the film. DE GRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra
note 3, at 4-5. Four days later, the Court handed down a unanimous decision, Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 240 (1915), which held that motion pictures were not protected speech under the First Amendment. DE GRAMZA & NEWMAN, supra
note 3, at xix.
The Birth of a Nation was only one of many films challenged over the years in court
proceedings and through attempted legislative reform. DE GRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note
3, at 3-59. Noting that nearly one million children nationwide attended movies daily, Georgia Congressman Dudley M. Hughes, Chairman of the House Education Committee, stated
that "if an immoral picture injured a single child, it should be a matter of concern to the
federal government." DE GRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 5. Prior to 1927, state legislatures considered, and rejected, more than bills designed to implement statewide film censorship were considered, and rejected, by state legislatures. DE GRAZiA & NEWMAN, supra
note 3, at 26.
In 1952, however, the Supreme Court reversed its holding in Mutual, and held that
expression by motion picture was subject to First Amendment protection. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
5. DE GRAziA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 5-6.
6. In an effort to avoid federal censorship and regulation of business practices, in
1916, motion picture producers and directors formed the National Association of the Motion Picture Industry ("NAMPI"). DE GRxzIA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 22. NAMPI,
which announced a self-censorship program to avert the growing governmental censorship
movement, also endorsed changes in federal legislation. DE GRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note
3, at 22 (noting that the federal statutory revisions had the affect of "linking movies with
the print media in the context of moral censorship.") See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994)
(prohibiting transportation of obscene material); 18 U.S.C. § 1494 (1994) (prohibiting sale
and distribution of obscene material). In 1922, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association of America ("MPPDA") replaced NAMPI and changed its name to the current industry organization, the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"). DE
GRAztA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 25, 64.
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided two cases which would define the current system
of industry self-regulation. DE GRAZiA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 116. See Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 691 (1968) (striking down a city ordinance which re-
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The present proliferation of computer-based communication services
appears to be a modern-day counterpart to the mass media explosion of
previous decades. In this technological communications world, known as
"Cyberspace," 7 users interact by exchanging electronic messages via
computers over telephone lines, as well as access on-line services and
information. 8 The Internet 9 is the global network of computers which
quired that motion pictures be classified as suitable or not suitable for minors); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (upholding state statute which prohibited knowing sale
of printed materials determined constitutionally obscene to minors).
The decisions prompted the film industry to adopt the current age classification system, which is designed to insure adult access to entertainment, while currently providing
public notice of content likely inappropriate for minors. DE GRAZIA & NEWMAN, supra note
3, at 120. Under the current ratings system, all films produced or distributed by MPAA
members (which includes most films shown in the United States), are submitted to the
Code and Rating Administration, which issues a preliminary rating, along with suggestions for improvement if applicable. See DE GRAzIA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 120 (stating that the ratings are not qualitative but only inform the public of picture's suitability for
children). See also JACK VALENTI, THE VOLUNTARY MovrE RATING SYSTEM 2-9 (1994) (explaining process and meaning of MPAA's voluntary rating system). "Although the new
classification system has been attacked by some as an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of screen expression, the system has inhibited the enactment of new governmental
censorship legislation aimed to protect children." DE GRAZLA & NEWMAN, supra note 3, at
120. Although various cities have governmental systems protecting minors, the MPAA's
ratings system is currently the only prescreening restriction on film content. DE GRAZIA &
NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 120-21.
7. "Most clearly defined, Cyberspace is where computer-mediated communications
take place, such as exchanging messages and information, and accessing on-line services
and data." Donna A. Gallagher, Free Speech on the Line: Modern Technology and the First
Amendment, 3 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 197, 205 n.2 (1995). For a comprehensive treatment
of the history, structure, content, and user profile analysis of the Internet, see ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49 (stipulated findings of fact).
8. Gallagher, supra note 7, at 198. Computer networks provide services such as electronic banking, chatting networks, shopping, television channels, video games, and interactive entertainment. Gallagher, supra note 7, at 205 n.17.
Information on most computer networks is found by accessing a bulletin board system,
or "host" computer. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203, 207 (1989). A bulletin board
operator may control the content of the posted data, or merely allow users to access information and/or communicate with others who have access to the board. Id. at 209. The
"Usenet" is an enormous, on-line bulletin board with more than 6,000 different topic groups
available daily. Adam C. Engst, Making the Internet Connection, MAcUSER, May 1995, at
66. The World Wide Web ("Web") links different servers globally through graphic "pages"
of information called "hypertext." Id.
Electronic mail ("e-mail") allows any individual with an established e-mail address to
post and receive electronically transmitted messages. Becker, supra at 211-12. E-mail is
similar to the U.S. Postal Service mail system because generally only those who have access to an e-mail address can send messages, and the user's password limits who can view
the messages. See Becker, supra at 211-12. Cf ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834 (noting
that simple e-mail, unlike a letter, is not secure and an intermediate computer can access
the contents sent between the sender and recipient unless the message is encrypted).
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connects its users to the majority of these services.1 0 More than onethird of all households in the United States have a personal computer,
and many of those have Internet access or subscribe to commercial online services." Increasingly, children seem to be the family "computer
12
experts."
The Internet also offers access to an infinite spectrum of subjects.' 3
Chat lines, a type of bulletin board, allow users a substantially greater degree of interaction, with the number of participants limited only by the technical sophistication of the
network. Becker, supra at 212-13.
9. As the center of the new telecommunications media termed by Vice-President Al
Gore as the "Information Superhighway," the Internet functions as a 'network of networks," which globally disseminates computer communications, data, text, voice and video.
Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the FirstAmendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619,
1637 n.1 (1995).
10. The Internet has a variety of users: large, commercial computer communications
services such as CompuServe Incorporated, the Microsoft Network, Prodigy Services Company, America Online, Inc., and Netcom On-Line Communications Service, as well as tens
of thousands of smaller university, government, and corporate networks. See, e.g., ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832-36 (stipulated findings of fact discussing individual Internet access avenues).
In turn, these users are linked by a common set of communications procedures known
as "protocols." See Mark A. Kassel & Joanne Keane Kassel, Don't Get Caught in the Net:
An Intellectual Property Practitioner'sGuide to Using the Internet, 13 J. MARSHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 373, n.2 (1995) (discussing history of the Internet, its resources, and instructions on access).
11. L.A. Lorek, Dangers Can Lurk in On-Line World: Pedophiles Use Network to Meet
Children, SuN-SENT., Aug. 30, 1995, at lB. According to a study released by Texas Internet
Consulting, the Internet reaches more than 21.3 million users worldwide, including an additional 27.5 million users with e-mail access. See Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on
the Internet, 437 PLI/PAT 417, at *4 (1996) (noting that the Internet reaches 100 countries
and allows e-mail access from 154 countries).
12. Phillip Elmer-Dewitt, On A Screen Near You: It's Popular,Pervasive and Surprisingly Perverse,According to the FirstSurvey of Online Erotica. And There's No Easy Way to
Stamp It Out, TnME, July 3, 1995, at 38 (statement by Republican Senator Dan Coates, cosponsor of the Communications Decency Act of 1996). The "computer boom" of recent years
has concurrently brought new users into the on-line community, and many of them are
children. David Landis, Sex, Laws & CyberSpace-RegulatingPron: Does it Compute?,
USA TODAY, Aug. 9, 1994, at 1D. See also Hammond, supra note 2, at 270 (noting that an
informal survey revealed that "American parents lack sufficient time and technological expertise to monitor and control what their children see on television and cable, hear on their
CDs or play and interact with on their computers").
13. For example, users can access computer bulletin boards through Usenet newsgroups, which provide subject matter on topics ranging from "molecular biology to nude
sunbathing." Gallagher, supra note 7, at 205 n.19. Likewise, many services have computer
chat rooms, which are described as "the equivalent of an electronic bar in which people talk
about everything, including sex." Lorek, supra note 11, at lB. According to Brian Ek,
spokesman for Prodigy, an on-line service provider, "[i]f you go on chat or go onto the Internet, you are leaving your house to a virtual world and will see people from all walks of
life." Lorek, supra note 11, at lB.
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Moreover, computer communications provide anonymity, 14 ease of access, 1 5 and the potential to reach mass audiences.1 6 While such features
promote the free interchange of expression, they also foster anxiety that
this rapidly developing technology allows children access to sexually ex17
plicit text, images, and violent content.
14. The explosion of the Internet has brought a concurrent public interest in anonymity. Paul Andrews, Behind the Mask-Online Users Hide Their Identities for Many Reasons, Legal and Illegal, THE SEA _E Tnms, Nov. 20, 1994, at J1. According to Richard
Gingras, worldwide services manager for Apple Computer's E-World on-line service,
"[wihen you're anonymous you tend to do things of a less responsible nature." Id. Many
on-line service providers prohibit true anonymity and keep records of "pseudonymous traffic" in order to locate users who abuse the service. See also Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the FirstAmendment in Cyberspaces,
104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995) (examining ways in which cultural behavior developing in
Cyberspace challenges the First Amendment). However, one of the technological advantages of computer networks is that they allow the -use of "anonymous reposters," which reroute messages through "server" computers, thus disguising its source. Andrews, supra.
15. "A user need have only a terminal-a display device and a keyboard-connected to
a modem, which in turn is connected to a telephone line, and the information (phone
number and sometimes passwords) necessary to access the service." Becker, supra note 8,
at 207-08. Moreover, communication between sites on the Internet "is facilitated by the
use of hypertext markup language ("HTML"), which allows for the creation of hyperlinks'
or links'." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 843. Simply by clicking on an HTML link, the
user moves easily from different files within one Web site, as well as from one Web site to
another. Id. Similar to that used by WESTLAW or LEXIS users, "search engines", search
available site headers for words or word combinations requested by the user, then allow the
user to choose from different sources of content. See id.
16. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 12, at 38 (statement by Civil Libertarian Mike Godwin, staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, criticizing indecency portion of
Communications Decency Act). See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 843 (noting that
diversity of content on the Internet is feasible because the Internet provides an easy and
inexpensive way for a speaker to reach an audience which could potentially number in the
millions).
As of November 1994, the estimated number of users of various on-line communications services included: Internet (5 million to 20 million users, Internet access through
local providers); CompuServe (2.4 million users); America Online (1.25 million users);
Prodigy (2 million-plus users estimated by number of households using system); Delphi
(undisclosed, but estimated at 200,000 users). Andrews, supra note 14, at J1.
17. As of August 1994, three of the top ten Usenet Newsgroup computer bulletin
boards accessible through the Internet involved sex-related topics, (alt.sex.stories,
alt.binaries.pictures and alt.sex) with between 200,000 to 400,000 readers each month.
Landis, supra note 12, at 1D. See also Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornographyon the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions,Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times By Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty
Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEo. L.J. 1849 (1995) (discussing results of 18month study surveying sexually explicit images and text on computer networks nationwide
and finding that of the Usenet newsgroups studied, 83.5% of the pictures were
pornographic).
Children may also have access to potentially dangerous or illegal activities. See Matthew Kaufman, West Hartford Man May Get 3-year Term in Bomb Recipe Case, HITFoRD
CouR. (Connecticut), Oct. 23, 1993, at B7 (discussing the arrest of Connecticut resident
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Prior to the February 8, 1996 passage of the Telecommunications
8
Competition and Deregulation Act of 1996 ("Telecommunications Act"),'
the Internet remained free from formal statutory regulation of the content of material transmitted through its networks.1.9 However, subsumed within the language of the Telecommunications Act are the
controversial provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
("CDA"). 20 The CDA attempts to protect children from "obscene" or "indecent" material by imposing criminal liability for violations. 2 x The
CDA expands section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, which forafter two boys were injured by homemade bomb they constructed after viewing bulletin
board service which contained an instruction guide on how to construct bombs and
explosives).
Moreover, Internet sites contain information on alcohol, the drug culture, alternative
life-styles, and religious and subversive groups. See generallyJohn Dahlquist, Jr. & Leslie
Ann Reis, On-Line Dangers to Children: Will Congress' Rush to Regulate the Internet's
Potentialfor Global Communications? 11-12, 45 n.57 (1995) (unpublished, on file with author) (noting that "[s]eparatist Groups like the Aryan Crusaders and the Ku Klux Klan as
well as para-military groups have Internet sites which not only contain information but are
used to recruit members," including using interactive games which may entice children).
See also David Armstrong, Internet Gin Joint: No ID Required, BosT. GLOBE, June 18,
1995, at Ml (describing the "DeKuyper Bar," an unmonitored site on the Internet, allowing
users who connect to the bar to access simulated bar scenes, including exchange with
strangers and invitations by the bartender to 'click on the bottles and shot glasses"). Other
alcoholic beverages companies who offer web sites include: Miller Brewing Co., <http:ll
www.zima.com.>; Guinness, <http://www.futurenet.com.uk/guiness/selectpub.html>; importers of Stolichnaya and Absolute Vodkas, <http://www.stoli.com>; and dozens of microbreweries, numerous wineries, arkd several retail liquor stores. Armstrong, supra.
18. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 15, 18, and 47 of the United States Code).
19. Prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") had no power to regulate the content of material transmitted
through computer communications services. Andrew Barrett, Reflections on Television Violence and Regulating New Technologies, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 105, *2 (1995). See also
In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commissioner's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision) (finding that enhanced services such as computer processing technology are not common carriers subject to
FCC regulation).
20. The CDA, originally introduced in early 1995 by Senator James Exon (D-Neb.)
along with co-sponsor Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.), S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., amends the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988 & Supp V 1993) (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1996)).
21. 141 CONG REC. S8087 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). See 47
U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1) (1996). See also discussion infra part II.C. (outlining provisions
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996). The CDA was introduced as "legislation to
expand the decency provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 to clearly cover the new
technologies which are increasing part of the American way of life." 141 CONG. REC. S1935
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). According to Senator Exon, the CDA
would broaden section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, which previously prohibited
obscene and indecent use of the telephone, to cover transmissions by computer as well.
Exon noted the CDA's goal:
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merly applied only to prohibited uses of the telephone, to include prohibited uses of any "telecommunications device" or "interactive computer
service." 22 In effect, the CDA imposes criminal liability on anyone who
uses a computer network to transmit not only illegal, obscene material,
but constitutionally protected "indecent" or "patently offensive" material
to anyone under eighteen years of age-regardless of whether that user
initiated the communication. 2 3 In response to the CDA's passage, the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") followed by Joe Shea, publisher of an electronic newspaper, successfully challenged the constitutionality of several of the CDA's provisions, 24 and obtained a preliminary
injunction against its enforcement. 2 5 The Department of Justice is curOnce passed, our children and families will be better protected from those who
would electronically cruise the digital world to engage children in inappropriate
communications and introductions. The Decency Act will also clearly protect citizens from electronic stalking and protect the sanctuary of the home from uninvited indecencies.
141 CONG. REc. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
22. The CDA amends section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)-(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The CDA defines an "interactive computer service" as
'any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that "the term encompasses means of making 'content' available to multiple users both on the vast web of linked networks popularly known
as 'the Internet' and on other information systems [such as electronic bulletin boards maintained by educational institutions or nonprofit organizations] not physically linked to the
Internet").
A "telecommunications device," on the other hand, does not include an "interactive
computer service," but is also not clearly defined under the CDA. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. at 829 n.5. However, the term likely covers those transmissions of material by
modem, and is meant to cover "users who traffic in indecent and patently offensive materials on the Internet through those services." See id. (noting that "[tihe resolution of the
tension between the scope of 'telecommunications device' and the scope of'interactive computer service' as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2) ... must await another day").
23. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1).
24. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828-30; Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950. The
same day President Clinton signed the CDA into law, the ACLU, joined by 19 other plaintiffs (collectively, "ACLU"), filed a complaint in federal court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that CDA sections 223(a) and 223(d) violated their First and Fifth
Amendment rights. Id. at 827. The American Library Association, Inc., along with 26
other plaintiffs, subsequently filed a similar action, and the court consolidated the actions.
Id.
25. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883-84. On February 8, 1996, Joe Shea, publisher
of an electronic newspaper, The American Reporter, brought a second constitutional challenge to section 223(d) of the CDA in the federal court in the Southern District of New
York, and successfully obtained a preliminary injunction against enforcement of that provision. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 922, 950. See also discussion infra Part II.C (discussing constitutional arguments raised in both cases).
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rently appealing both cases to the Supreme Court.2 6
Proponents of regulation of the content of material transmitted over
the Internet believe that when individuals use computers to disseminate
material inappropriate for minors or to promote behavior which may endanger their safety, 27 the government has a compelling interest in
shielding minors from such expression. 28 On the other hand, free-speech
advocates, legislators and other critics of legislative reform argue that to
purge the Internet of all material unsuitable for children would deny information to adult users, thus impinging on protected First Amendment
29
rights.
26. Linda Greenhouse, High Court Splits on Indecency Law Covering Cable TV, N.Y.
TnEs, June 29, 1996, at 1. On July 1, 1996, the Department of Justice filed its notice of
appeal with the Supreme Court, which is expected to hear the case in the Fall of 1996, and
to render a decision in Spring, 1997. Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition, Fightfor
Free Speech Online Headed to Supreme Court (visited September 16, 1996) <http://
www.vtw.org/speech/> (posting Department of Justice' Notice of Appeal). ACLU v. Reno
and Shea could likely be consolidated for purposes of Supreme Court consideration. Id.
See also Declan McCullagh, DOJ Dodge, HoTWIRED (visited Aug. 21, 1996) <http://
www.netizen.com/netizen/ 96/34index2a.html> (describing mechanics of Department of
Justice' CDA appeal).
27. See Gallagher, supra note 7, at 197 (noting increased concern for children's safety
when individuals with a dangerous or criminal agenda use on-line computer services as a
vehicle to pursue minors who also use these services). See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at
844 (noting that "[tihe accidental retrieval of sexually explicit material is one manifestation of the larger phenomenon of irrelevant search results").
28. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 852-53 (discussing the Government's argument
"that shielding minors from access to indecent material is the compelling interest supporting the CDA"). See also Gallagher, supra note 7, at 204. In support of the Communications
Decency Act, Senator James Exon, a co-sponsor of the Act, stated that "children should be
protected from the pornography and smut that I fear could turn the Information Superhighway into a red light district." James Coates, "Catch-22" in Cleaning Up Smut in
Cyberspace, Cm. TRm., June 4, 1995, at B1.
29. Kara Swisher and Elizabeth Corcoran, Gingrich Condemns On-Line Decency Act;
Opposition to Senate Version May Doom Bill, WASH. POST, June 22, 1995, at D8. Prior to
enactment of the CDA, House Speaker Newt Gingrich criticized the legislature's attempt at
telecommunications reform, noting that "[ilt is clearly a violation of free speech ... a violation of the rights of adults to communicate with each other." Id.
Mike Godwin, civil libertarian and staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, maintained "that the indecency portion of the bill would transform the vast library of
the Internet into a children's reading room, where only subjects suitable for kids could be
discussed." Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 12, at 38. "It's government censorship," said Marc
Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. "The First Amendment shouldn't
end where the Internet begins." Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 12, at 38.
Commentators have likewise proposed alternate solutions to intrusive content regulation of the Internet. Laurence Tribe, a Harvard law school professor, has proposed a Constitutional Amendment to protect expression regardless of the medium through which that
expression is transmitted. Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum?, 81 GEo.
L.J. 409, 411 (1992). Computer industry advocates have also suggested federal legislation
to empower parents and protect children by using technological approaches rather than
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This Comment argues that the legislature is not the appropriate entity to regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech transmit30
ted by users of this rapidly developing communications medium.
Concurrent with this theory, this Comment explores the potential for industry and user self-supervision, rather than intrusive government regulation, to control the content of computer speech. First, this Comment
examines the methods through which the traditional communications
media have shielded minors from certain offensive speech within the
boundaries of the First Amendment. Second, this Comment outlines the
current federal regulatory scheme under the CDA which imposes similar
restrictions on speech transmitted through computer services. Third,
this Comment argues that new legislation, such as the CDA's indecency
provisions, are unnecessary because existing laws and judicial doctrines
are capable of assessing liability for harmful material communicated
through on-line services. Moreover, the technology exists to provide parents with adequate notice of, and control over, unwanted or offensive material. Fourth, this comment proposes that the CDA's current regulatory
scheme will likely prove impractical-and ineffective-to enforce against
the infinite number of potential users of computer services. Finally, this
Comment concurs with both the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
the Southern District of New York's decisions and argues that the CDA,
or similar regulation of content, will not withstand a constitutional
challenge.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE LIMITS OF FREE SPEECH GUARANTEED UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment, with clarity and brevity, mandates that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
content censorship. Coates, supra note 28, at B1. Ardent civil libertarians, such as Jerry
Berman of the Center for Democracy & Technology in Washington, D.C., a public interest
organizations that develop and implements public policies designed to protect civil liberties
and democratic values in the new digital media, have argued for a new federal law that
would recognize on-line communications as a new medium. See Berman and Weitzner,
supra note 9, 1637.
30. See Gallagher, supra note 7, at 205 (discussing that computer communication
should be subjected to same degree of First Amendment protection as print material, and
advocating that "[ain understanding of the capabilities of technical advancements is essential for Congress and the courts to effectively determine if regulation of CyberSpeech is
even warranted"). See also Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1620 (arguing that decentralized open access and user control over content of interactive communications media will
best serve First Amendment values and avoid government content regulation).
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the press." 3 1 In accordance with this provision, the United States
Supreme Court has traditionally granted great deference to First
Amendment values which promote a free exchange of ideas. 32 Several
important principles guide a court's analysis of First Amendment issues.
The first principle is that speech, whatever its form or message, should
be unimpaired by the threat of government censorship. 33 The second
principle is based on the long-held value that the public be exposed to
34
diverse and vigorous expression with minimal government regulation.
When free of censorship or threat of civil or criminal liability, uninhibited expression furthers the society's through advancement through the
35
development public culture and political debate.
However, the First Amendment's guarantee does not extend to all
forms of expression. 3 6 For example, the Supreme Court excluded obscenity from the ambit of First Amendment protection. 3 7 Although a state
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are funda-

mental rights which are safeguarded against state interference by the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
32. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974). In rejecting a
Florida "right to reply" statute as violative of the First Amendment's guarantee of a free
press, the Supreme Court noted that "[it has yet to be demonstrated how governmental
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time." Id. at 258.
33. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S.Ct.
2445, 2456-58 (1994). See also Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76
(1976) (noting that the First Amendment's primary concern is that "there be full opportunity for expression in all its varied forms to convey a desired message").
34. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 859 (1982) (noting that "the right to receive
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of
speech, press, and political freedom").
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (noting that constitutional safeguards for freedom of expression are fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people). See also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (noting that constitutional protections for
speech and press do not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and
beliefs which are offered).
36. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (noting that "[the First and
the Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes"). See also N.Y Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (stating that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that "fighting words" precluded from ambit of First Amendment protection); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919) (holding that speech presenting "clear and present
danger'"-such as yelling "Fire!" in a crowed theater-is subject to restriction).
37. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Supreme Court has made efforts to clearly enunciate a
cohesive, yet comprehensive standard by which courts determine what works are obscene
and, thus, excluded from the umbrella of constitutional protection; in Miller, the Court
established a three-part level of analysis to determine whether allegedly "obscene" content
justified regulation. Id. The Court reasoned that because "[it is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New york
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cannot, under certain circumstances, criminalize private "possession" of

obscene material, 38 the Constitution clearly does not protect an individual's right to distribute or transmit obscenity. 3 9 Accordingly, child pornography, which is by definition "obscene", clearly falls outside the
bounds of First Amendment protection, 40 as exhibited by federal and
City," allegedly obscene works should be evaluated under contemporary community stan-

dards rather than a uniform national standard. Id. at 32. Moreover, the Court discarded
its earlier obscenity analysis which required that obscene works be found "utterly without
redeeming social value," and held the appropriate test to be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
Id. at 39. For a development of existing standards of obscenity prior to Miller, see Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 494 (presuming that obscenity lacks "redeeming social importance"). Cf Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) (holding that plaintiff has burden of showing that material is "utterly without redeeming social
value").
However, even though protection under the First Amendment does not extend to obscenity, obscene speech is not necessarily illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Twelve 200Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973) (holding that state governments
may legalize obscenity, including use by consenting adults). Hence, the Court left to the
states the task of determining which works are "obscene" under the Miller analysis and
held that state statutes "designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 97, 101 (1974) (affirming obscenity conviction that elaborated on community standards test, and rejecting
requirement of a uniform, nationwide standard). See also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
500-01 (1987) (holding that a "community standard" is properly evaluated according to a
reasonable person within a given community).
38. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (striking down statute on basis that
"[w]hatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the
public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts"). See also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973)
(holding that zone of privacy under First Amendment for obscenity does not extend beyond
the home).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1971) (determining that the
right to view obscene materials in the privacy of a home is markedly different than the
right to deal, distribute and sell obscenity).
40. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-65 (1982) (holding that the Miller obscenity standard is not applicable to child pornography as compared to that involving
adults because child pornography is "per se" obscene). See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
105, 109 (1990) (upholding Ohio statute which prohibits possession and viewing of child
pornography). Child pornography has been broadly interpreted to include lascivious exhibitions of children absent display of nudity or sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v.
Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 743-51 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115. S.Ct. 897 (1995) (upholding
conviction under federal child pornography statute which criminalizes possession of "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" absent showing of child nudity or genitalia).
For a thorough study of child pornography and Cyberspace see John C. Scheller, PC Peep
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state statutes addressing such crimes. 4 1
In contrast, the First Amendment protects sexual, vulgar, or crude
expression that is found "indecent," but not "obscene" the presumption
that such expression may have some literary, political, or artistic
value. 42 Nevertheless, where sexually oriented, offensive, or graphic
speech may affect children, the Court has determined that a state has a
Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child Pornography, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 989 (1994)
(discussing the recent epidemic of child pornography on computer bulletin board networks).
In contrast, adult pornographic material is not presumed obscene. See Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62 (1989) (holding that a court must make initial determination of "obscenity" before removing material from circulation).
41. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state statutes
proscribing the transmission of child pornography).
42. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1970) (explaining that "we cannot
indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process"). Accordingly, as Justice Harlan
succinctly explained, "[o]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Id. at 25.
The Supreme Court has vaguely defined "indecent" material, in the context of cable
and broadcast media, as "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be
in the audience." Denver Area Consortium v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 116 S.Ct.
2375, 2389-90 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citing Pacifica,438 U.S. at 732) (upholding FCC's
definition of indecency, and noting that such material is language which would normally be
offensive enough to fall within the definition of "obscene" but for the fact that the material
also has serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value or nonprurient purposes). See
also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 (holding that George Carlin's monologue featuring seven
four-letter words depicting sexual or excretory activities and organs "indecent" within
meaning of FCC's definition of indecency as it applies to radio broadcast). Cf Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (noting that nudity, without more, is protected expression).
In the context of communications transmitted by computer, however, the definition of
"indecent" material is not clear. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 862-63 (striking
down the CDA's definition of indecency as unconstitutionally vague where the CDA fails to
define the term "indecent," and the FCC has not promulgated regulations defining indecency in the medium of cyberspace as required under Pacifica and its progeny). But see
Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 935 (upholding the CDA's definition of indecency "[i]n light of
Supreme Court and other precedent rejecting claims that the language used by the FCC to
define indecency is unconstitutionally vague").
Within the ambit of First Amendment protection, federal and state governments are
generally prohibited from constructing regulations directed toward the subject matter, content or viewpoint of protected speech -which includes "indecent" material- absent a compelling government interest. See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S.Ct. at 2458-59. A court
initiating an inquiry into the constitutional validity of a government restriction on protected speech will devote "the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content." Id. at 2459.
See also Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (citing Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) (stating that "the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content").
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compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor.4 3 Therefore, the government may restrict indecent
speech only if that regulation serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 44 For example, the restriction
oversteps its bounds if its provisions concurrently prevent adults from
45
obtaining protected material.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the mere threat of
sanctions may deter some speakers from exercising their right to speak
"almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions."4 6 Hence, government may regulate speech protected by the First Amendment "only
47
with narrow specificity."
A statute or regulation is "overbroad" if it sweeps within its ambit
not only speech which may legitimately be restricted, but a substantial
amount of protected speech as well. 48 Due to the fact that such over43. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
44. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. As the Supreme Court noted in Sable:
[Tihe Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest. . . . [B]ut to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, 'it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interest without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.'
Id.
45. See id. at 131 (striking down blanket prohibition on obscene as well as indecent
commercial telephone messages which had the "effect of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear"). See also Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down statute which denied adults, as well as
children, access to books containing obscene language "tending to the corruption of the
morals of youth").
Minors, like adults, also have First Amendment rights. Cf Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975). In Erznoznik, the Court struck down an ordinance
which banned drive-in movie theaters from exhibiting all films containing nudity, regardless of context or pervasiveness. Id. The Court held that minors are entitled to First
Amendment protection, and "only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may
government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them." Id. at 212. The
Court explained, "[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or
images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them." Id. at 213-14.
46. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217
(noting that where a statute unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct, the
likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify
an overbreadth attack).
47. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
48. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). In general terms, the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine 'recognizes that an unconstitutional restriction of freedom of expression may deter parties not before the court from engaging in protected speech
and thereby escape judicial review." Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 938 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S.
at 612-13). Hence, under the overbreadth doctrine, "an individual whose own speech or
conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also
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inclusive regulations may result in a "chilling effect" on speech that may
have serious scientific, literary, artistic, or cultural value, the court may
strike down the statute as facially invalid if the overbreadth is
"substantial."49
A statute or regulation that fails to satisfy the overbreadth test may
still be challenged on its face as "unduly vague."50 Accordingly, the
threatens others not before the court-those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to
have the law declared partially invalid.'" Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482
U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)
(striking down resolution imposed by board of airport commissioners as substantially overbroad where resolution prohibited all protected expression rather than that which would
might create problems with traffic congestion and for airport users); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at
213 (striking down city ordinance that prohibited nudity in films, in part, because the ordinance treated all nudity as harmful, and noting that regulations which restrict expression
may not sweep so broadly as to ban speech that does not have the harmful effects the
government sought to remedy).
49. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574 (1987) (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (1973))
(noting that requirement that overbreadth be "substantial" exists because overbreadth doctrine is "manifestly, strong medicine" with a realistic danger that statute will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protection of parties not before the Court). A
"facial" challenge means that the law is "invalid in toto-and therefore incapable of any
valid application." Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 495 n.5 (1982), reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950 (1982) (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452 (1974)). Moreover, where a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, the court should construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems
if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
613. See also N.Y v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773 n.24 (upholding a New York statute that
prohibits persons from knowingly promoting sexual performance by a child under the age
of sixteen as not overbroad because the "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications").
50. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497, 499 (noting that if a law interferes
with the "right of free speech . . . a more stringent vagueness test should apply"). The
appropriate analysis, the Court has explained, is to first decide whether the statute reaches
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at 494-95. If it does not,
"[t]he court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if
the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Id. Hence, the plaintiff
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.
Therefore, "[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the law as applied to the conduct of others." Village ofHoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at
495.
Generally, a vague statute may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it fails to provide fair notice as to the actions constituting criminal liability. If that
statute attempts to limit freedom of expression, it may also violate the First Amendment if
it prevents that individual from exercising that right. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
In Grayned, the Supreme Court outlined the standards for evaluating a vagueness
challenge. 408 U.S. at 108-09. First, a vague statute fails to proved an individual "of ordinary intelligence" with notice as to precisely what activity the statute prohibits. Id. There-
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Supreme Court has noted that legislation aimed at protecting children,
such as legislation enacted with respect to adults, must "be clearly
drawn and that the standards adopted be reasonably precise."5 1 Such
standards effectively provide notice to those who must obey them, and
they also avoid arbitrary or discriminatory administration in
52
enforcement.

B.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF
PROTECTED SPEECH IN THE TRADITIONAL MASS MEDIA

The Supreme Court in its review of regulations which attempt to
curtail the content of protected speech, attempted to balance the compelling interest in protecting minors from offensive content, yet allow adults
unrestricted access. 5 3 In order to balance these competing interests
within the context of the traditional mass media such as broadcast,
cable, and telephone, the Court has examined the technological characteristics of the communications medium. The presence of certain features, such as the number of channels available to all speakers and the
pervasive nature of the medium, may justify the appropriate level of restriction over the content of protected speech.5 4 Historically, the
fore, a vague law may trap an innocent individual by failing to provide a clear guideline as
to what speech is actually forbidden. JoHN NowAx & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 986 (5th ed., West 1995). Second, a vague statute may encourage arbitrary
arrests and convictions, based on a lack of "explicit standards for those who apply them."
See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (noting that "[a] vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application"). See
also Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2389-90 (holding that a provision in the statute
allowing cable operators to prohibit programming that the operator "reasonably believes"
may be patently offensive as judged by contemporary community standards not unconstitutionally vague where, inter alia, the term "reasonably" serves to constrain the operator's
discretion).
51. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,689 (1968) (quoting People v.
Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311,313 (1965) (holding an ordinance that required all films be classified
as "suitable for young persons" invalid due to lack of narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards).
52. Id. at 689-90.
53. See, e.g., Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2384-85 (noting that throughout
the history of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the basic First Amendment principles
have been restated and refined in order to balance conflicting interests and the "special
circumstances of each field of application").
54. In particular circumstances, the Court has determined that "differences in characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them." See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) (holding that
television broadcast is subject to First Amendment protection, but "ability of new technology to produce sounds more raucous than those of the human voice" justifies restriction on
sound level, hours and places of use, if restrictions are reasonable and applied without
discrimination); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747 (noting that the constitutional protection ac-
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Supreme Court granted the print media virtually unlimited First
Amendment protection. 5 5 The broadcast media, cable service providers,
and common carriers receive a lesser quantum of protection under the
56
hierarchy of First Amendment interests.
1. The BroadcastMedia
Parents, rather than legislatures, have traditionally been responsible for controlling what their children see and hear.5 7 However, where
the broadcast media is concerned, the Court recognizes that States have
a compelling interest in protecting the well-being of children from exposure to indecent material. 58 Traditionally, the Court has justified the
appropriate level of content restriction on the scarcity of channels inherent in broadcast technology. 5 9 However, the pervasiveness of the mecorded to a communication containing "patently offensive sexual and excretory language
need not be the same in every context").
55. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
56. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51 (1978) (concerning radio monologue); Turner
BroadcastingSys., 114 S.Ct. at 2469 (concerning cable programmers and operators); Sable,
492 U.S. at 130 (concerning commercial telephone messages).
57. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (holding that "the values of
parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their child in their early and
formative years have a high place in our society"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute that prohibits mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives because the statute denies parents truthful
information bearing on their ability to discuss birth control and to make informed decisions); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (noting that provision prohibiting parents from distributing contraceptives to children amounts to "direct interference" with parental guidance).
58. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731. "[O1f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. Cf Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984)
(noting that if "a similar ban . . . applied to newspapers and magazines, we would not
hesitate to strike it down as violative of the First Amendment"). For the purposes of broadcast regulation, a "minor" is anyone under the age of 18. See, e.g., Action for Children's
Television v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 58 F.3d 654, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting
that "[in light of Supreme Court precedent and the broad national consensus that children
under the age of 18 need to be protected from exposure to sexually explicit materials...
Government interest extends to minors of all ages").
59. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). In NBC, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's power to enact special regulation over chain broadcasting on the basis of the
"public interest, convenience or necessity." Id. The Court found that the scarcity rationale
justified the FCC's allocation of frequencies and consideration of program content in formulating licensing decisions. Id. at 215-217. The Court reasoned that "[u]nlike other modes of
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and
that is why ... it is subject to governmental regulation." Id. at 226. See also Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding that inherent physical limitation on number of speakers who can broadcast permits limited content restraints on programming, as well as certain affirmative obligations on broadcast licenses); See Children's
Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303a (1988 Supp. V 1993) (requiring children's educa-
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dium into the home where children may be present, as well as its
concurrent accessibility, have been the pivotal factors courts have6 0 used
to distinguish broadcast from other mass communications media.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,6 1 the Supreme Court upheld the
Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC")62 power to regulate radio
programming that the FCC found to be indecent.6 3 In order tojustify the
restrictions on the content of the broadcast, the Court focused on the
technological characteristics of the medium. 6 4 The broadcast media, the
Court reasoned, possess a uniquely pervasive presence in the homes of
the American public, and the programming is easily accessible to
65
children.
tional programming). See also Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1621 (discussing open
and decentralized architecture of new interactive communications may provide unlimited
number of information providers and users which will eliminate scarcity rationale).
60. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
61. Id.
62. The Communications Act of 1934 empowered the FCC to regulate all broadcasting
stations in the United States, including interstate and foreign telephone, telegraph, and
cable services, and communications by satellite. JOHN ELLMORE, BROADCASTING LAW AND

REGULATION 36 (1982). See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1994) (outlining the FCC's regulatory authority over broadcasting and telecommunications facilities).
63. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729. In Pacifica, the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the FCC had the authority to regulate a radio broadcast that was indecent but not
obscene. Id. The FCC claimed that Pacifica station WBAI's radio broadcast of satiric humorist George Carlin's 12-minute monologue, "Filthy Words," violated rules on indecent
broadcasting. Id. at 731-32. The FCC based its power to regulate indecent broadcasting on
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), "which forbids the use of any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications," and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), which required the FCC
to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." Id. at 730.
Pacifica, in turn, argued that the FCC's ban was unconstitutional censorship, and challenged whether the monologue was "indecent" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Id.
The Court found that although the Communications Act of 1934 denied the FCC the
power to edit broadcasts in advance and to excise material it deemed inappropriate programming, the Act did not limit the FCC in its power to regulate the broadcast of obscene,
indecent, or profane language. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735-38. The Court also held that the
language was "indecent" within the meaning of the statute. Id. The Court noted that
although "[pirurient appeal is an element of the obscene .... the normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." Id. at 740.
Therefore, the Court determined that speech which is not "obscene," but merely "indecent,"
is entitled to limited protection under the First Amendment. Id. However, constitutional
protection afforded such speech "need not be the same in every context." Id. at 747.
The Court then turned to the broader question of "whether a broadcast of patently
offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content."
Pacifica,438 U.S. at 745.
64. Id. at 747-50.
65. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748. The Court noted that "[blecause the broadcast audience
is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or
viewer from unexpected program content." Id. Therefore, "[platently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in
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2. Cable Television
The Supreme Court recognized that cable television services, like
the broadcast media, exercise editorial control over the content of their
programming, and are entitled to First Amendment protection. 6 6 Similarly, due to the potentially pervasive presence cable has in viewers
homes-and its concomitant effect on children-the Court has granted
cable operators a similar latitude of protection under the First Amendment as that granted broadcasters where indecent material is
67
concerned.
Generally, cable operators may decline to carry indecent programming on "leased access" 6 8 or commercial channels, but not with respect
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder." Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728, 737 (1970). Hence, the government's compelling interest in protecting the "well being
of its youth" and in "supporting parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the FCC's regulation of otherwise protected expression. Id. at 749-51.
Subsequent to the ruling in Pacifica,the FCC has found indecent speech objectionable
in similar circumstances due to the pervasiveness of the medium and its accessibility to
children. See, e.g., In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987) (Reconsideration Order) (holding that explicit references to indecent material in morning and evening broadcasts after 10 p.m., violate federal statute governing broadcast). Although
telecommunications legislation for violence currently does not exist, the FCC has implemented "safe harbor rules," which ban certain kinds of programming during hours when
minors are most likely to be a significant part of the audience. Barrett, supra note 19, at
*1. These rules, the FCC has found, are necessary in order to keep childrens' exposure to
such material at a minimum. See Action for Children's Television v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (holding that safe harbor rules from ten
p.m. to six a.m. apply to all broadcasters of indecent material).
66. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991); accord Turner BroadcastingSys.,
114 S.Ct. at 2456 (noting that cable programmers and operators "engage in and transmit
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the
First Amendment").
Generally, the cable television industry includes both cable operators and cable programmers. Turner BroadcastingSys., 114 S.Ct. at 2452. Cable operators may own the
physical network and transmit the cable signal to the viewer, but may also have control
over programming. Id. In other instances, independent programmers produce television
shows and sell or license the programs to the operators. Id. Hence, the operator functions
as a conduit for the programmer's material by transmitting the programs to subscribers on
a continuous and unedited basis. Id.
67. See, e.g., DenverArea Consortium,116 S.Ct. at 2388. See also TurnerBroadcasting
Sys., 114 S.Ct. at 2457 (noting that the "special physical characteristics of broadcast transmission, not the economic characteristics of the broadcast market" justify the appropriate
level of scrutiny granted regulation of a communications medium).
68. Federal regulatory measures apply to two different kinds of cable television channels. Greenhouse, supra note 26, at 1. The first is "leased access" channels, which federal
law requires cable systems operators to make available to independent programmers for a
fee. Greenhouse, supra note 26, at 1. The second is "public access" channels which the
operators provide free of charge for "public, educational, or government use" ("PEG channels"). DenverArea Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2381. See also Greenhouse, supra note 26, at
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to community access channels used by local governments and community
groups. 69 In Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,70 the
Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning the regulation of the
content of material transmitted by cable network, the Court, inter alia,
struck down a provision of the Cable Television Consumer and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Act"). 7 1 The defeated provision required cable
systems operators that lease channels to commercial providers of indecent programming to scramble the signals transmitted by the channels. 72 Specifically, in order to obtain access to the indecent material on
leased access channels, the 1992 Act required the cable subscriber to request access to the indecent programming, in writing, up to thirty days
in advance. 7 3 The court found that the provisions failed to provide the
least restrictive means available to limit children's exposure to indecency
and ignored less-intrusive alternatives. 74 In light of new technology
1 (noting the provision of free access is a condition to the cable operator's franchise). Moreover, the cable operators are forbidden from exercising editorial control over these PEG
channels. Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2397.
69. Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2398.
70. 116 S.Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality opinion).
71. See, e.g., Cable and Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532(h), 532(j) and 558.
72. Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2394. Under the 1992 amendments, cable
operators could refuse to carry indecent programming on both leased access and public
access channels. Alliance for Community Media v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 56
F.3d 105, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. 2374
(1996). However, if the cable operator chose to carry indecent programs on the leased access channels, the restrictions required the operator to segregate the material and to block
access to the channel until the subscriber affirmatively requested access. Id. If the operator decided to carry programming on public access channels, the statute imposed no similar
scrambling or access requirements. Id. The statute described "indecent" programming as
'one that 'describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards for the cable medium.'"
Id. at 113 n.4.
73. Id. at 113.
74. Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2394. In the earlier decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the statute, which allowed
cable operators to prohibit indecent programs on leased access or public access channels,
failed to constitute 'state action" that warranted First Amendment review. Alliance for
Community Media, 56 F.3d at 121. Because statute granted the cable operator, rather
than the government, the discretion whether or not to ban indecent program, the statute
merely turned the editorial control over to the cable operator. See id. (noting that when a
cable operator chooses to carry indecent programming on any channel ... [this decision]
does not convert its refusal to carry indecent programming into state action).
In Denver Area Consortium, however, the Supreme Court rejected the view that the
First Amendment did not apply. 116 S.Ct. 2382. The Court struck down the provision
which permitted the operators to decide whether or not to broadcast indecent programming
on the public access channels, based on the fact that those channels had historically failed
to present problems with indecent programming. Id. at 2397. However, the provision permitting the operators to ban indecent programming from leased access channels was appro-

70

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XV

available to block programming, the Court could find no reason to enforce a system that requires willing viewers to identify themselves with
the subsequent risk of embarrassment by inadvertent exposure, which
of the list of those who
could likely result if such viewers became "part
75
wish to watch the 'patently offensive' channel.
3. Common Carriers
Telephone services, on the other hand, provide the user with significantly more control over the receipt of content than the television or radio audience has over what it sees or hears. For this reason, Congress
subjected common carriers 76 to significantly less regulation than that
governing broadcast or cable services. 77 For example, in Sable Commupriate; this provision was a means of achieving the underlying purpose of protecting
children, given the combination of the flexibility permitted the operators, and the "extraordinarily important problem" of controlling children's exposure to "patently offensive depictions of sex." Id. at 2385.
75. Id. at 2391 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) ("finding unconstitutional a requirement that recipients of Communist literature notify the Post
Office that they wish to receive it").
Instead, the hardware presently available on cable boxes, as well as the "v-chip" technology installed on all new television sets, allows viewers to control their own household's
access to indecent programming. Id. at 2392. Moreover, under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, cable operators are required to block, at a subscriber's request, any programs
which the viewer declines to subscribe. Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2392. Moreover, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that cable operators are required to
block access to programming on unleased or PEG channels, that are "primarily dedicated to
sexually-oriented programming." Id.
76. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-58, 201-27 (1994) (enabling legislation for FCC's jurisdiction over interstate and foreign telephone, wire services, and radio communications).
77. Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 generally prohibits telephone companies from knowingly allowing their services to be used for
the purpose of making obscene or indecent calls to anyone under eighteen years of age. See
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(c) (1994), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)-(e) (amending § 223 to include
communications made by means of a "telecommunications device" and "interactive computer service"). Generally, § 223 provides for criminal liability, in the form of a fine and/or
imprisonment for violation of its provisions. 47 U.S.C. § 223.
However, like cable television services, the network provider may not always be the
information provider. See Hammond,supra note 2, at 274. The telephone network provider
can avoid liability by refusing to provide billing services or by obtaining the subscriber's
permission to provide the services. Id. By following this procedure, the provider is not held
liable if it does not know that the information transmitted was indecent. Id.
The telephone message provider, on the other hand, will not be held liable for limiting
access to its services through use of access codes, credit card verification or various scrambling devices. Id. See also 47 C.F.R. 64.201 (1995) (FCC regulations regarding "safe harbor" defenses available to indecent telephone information services under § 223). For a
comprehensive analysis of access and indecency regulation of common carriers see Hammond, supra note 2, at 274 (noting that "[s]ubscribing consumers have the option of notifying the network provider that they wish to access such information, thereby taking some
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nications of California,Inc. v. FCC, 78 the Supreme Court held as unconstitutionally overbroad a blanket prohibition on obscene, as well as
indecent, speech carried through interstate commercial telephone
messages. 79 The Court reasoned that the regulation was not sufficiently
tailored to serve the compelling interest of prohibiting minors from exposure to the indecent telephone messages because the regulation, in effect,
also denied adults access.8 0 The technical features of telephonic audiotext services were substantially different from those inherent in broadcast transmission. 8 ' Because the "dial-it" customer must take affirmative steps to access the service, the individual is not a "captive audience"
82
like the broadcast listener or viewer.

control over its availability and receipt," thus absolving both the network and information
provider of liability).
78. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
79. Id. at 130-31. In Sable, providers of sexually-oriented prerecorded telephone
messages ("dial-a-porn") sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a 1988 amendment to § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which imposed a blanket ban on indecent as well as obscene "dial-a-porn" telephone messages. Id. at 117 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(b) (1982) (Supp. V 1988)) (providing criminal penalties for commercial transmission
of sexually oriented communications to minors). The Court held that although the statute
did not unconstitutionally prohibit obscene expression, the regulation on protected indecent expression violated the First Amendment. Id. at 125-26.
80. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129. In distinguishing the Pacifica Court's narrow holding, the
Court reasoned that technological characteristics which justified restriction on the broadcast of indecent expression did not uniformly apply to the "dial-a-porn" services. Id.
81. Id. at 118.
82. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128. As the Court explained,
The context of dial-in services, where a caller seeks and is willing to pay for the
communication, is manifestly different from a situation in which a listener does
not want the received message. Placing a telephone call is not the same as turning
on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message.
Id. Thus, the legislature can limit access to indecent material, but it must do so with the
"least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." Id. at 126. See also Dial Information Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1541-42 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1072 (1992) (upholding the constitutionality of § 223 based on the legislature's determination that a telephone company requirement of age verification prior to using indecent
audiotext services is the only means available to prevent children's access); Information
Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "reverse blocking," which provides telephone access to those who request dial-a-porn service, is narrowly tailored and effective
means of limiting minors' access to service). But see Fabulous Assocs. v. Pennsylvania Pubic Utility Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a state statute which required adults who wanted to listen to sexually explicit telephone messages apply for a ninedigit access code is overbroad, as to burden placed on adults).
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PROPOSED REGULATION OF SPEECH TRANSMITTED
THROUGH COMPUTER

Like other emerging communications media, the proliferation of interactive computer technology has prompted concern regarding children's exposure to illegal or inappropriate material. The ideology behind
competing interests of free-speech and protection of children has thrust
the issue into the forefront of legislative debate. In response to these
concerns, various members of the Senate and House of Representatives
introduced during 1995 several, diametrically opposed measures addressing liability for material transmitted through computer
83
communications.
The Communications Decency Act of 199684 emerged from the de83. A thorough discussion of the past year's competing legislation is beyond the scope
of this Comment. For a comprehensive treatment of proposed legislation concerning indecent speech on the Internet, see Stacey J. Rappaport, Rules of the Road: The Constitutional
Limits of Restricting Indecent Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6 FoRDHAm
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 326-335 (1995) (discussing bills introduced to Congress
in 1995 which would affect the transmission of indecent speech on the Internet). See generally Protection of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995, S.892, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (proposing a criminal statute which would regulate transmission of indecent material to children); The Child Protection, User Empowerment and Free Expression
in Interactive Media Study Act, S.714, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing that Department of Justice conduct a study on means for restricting access to unwanted material
transmitted through computer networks); The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (prohibiting federal and state regulation of computer services and encouraging development of user-controlled technologies
which would block access to unwanted information).
84. 47 U.S.CA. § 223(a)-(h) (West 1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994)). The CDA
amends § 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, that previously provided fines of up to
$50,000 and/or prison terms of not more than six months for obscene, indecent, or harassing uses of telecommunications facilities (i.e., the telephone). As passed, the CDA amends
§ 223 by adding two new sections (a) and (d), which apply to prohibited uses of a "telecommunications device" and "interactive computer service." See, e.g., § 223 (a),(d). The CDA's
controversial amendments provide in relevant part:
223. Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications
(a) Whoever (1) in interstate or foreign communications (A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person;
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of ages, regardless of
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whether the maker of such communication placed the call or
initiate the communication;
(C) makes a telephone call or utilized a telecommunications device,
whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten,
or harass any person at the called number or who receives the
communications;
(D) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number; or
(E) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates communication with a telecommunications device, during which conversation or communications ensues, soley to harass any person at the
called number or who receives the communications; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control
to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent
that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(d) Sending or displaying offensive material to persons under 18
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person
or person under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that
in context depict or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such services placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223.
As passed, the CDA makes several substantive changes to § 223. First, the CDA
amends § 223(a) to include prohibited uses of a "telecommunications device" and "interactive computer services" within its ambit. § 223(a),(d). See also § 230(e)(2) (defining "interactive computer services"); § 223(h)(1) (defining "telecommunications device"). As for
federal criminal liability, the CDA increases fines to $100,000 and the prison term from six
months to not more than two years. § 223(a),(d).
In effect, a user is prohibited from using a computer or computer network to transmit
in interstate or foreign commerce obscene or indecent material to anyone that the user
knows is under eighteen years of age. § 223(a). Although subsection 223(d) uses the term
"patently offensive" to describe the prohibited material, the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive" have been used interchangeably. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 850;
Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 935 n.19. In addition, the CDA creates liability for anyone to "knowingly" permit any "telecommunications facility" to be used to transmit prohibited material
to anyone under eighteen years of age, and the user must have "intent" that it be used for
such activity. § 223(a)(2), (d)(2).
According to Senator Exon, the CDA's sponsor, those who function as common carriers
by simply providing access to another network-and are likewise not responsible for the
content of the material-and then subsequently transmit indecent material to minors without knowledge of the content of the message, will not be held liable. Kenneth D. Salomon
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bate as the Internet's governing statute when President Clinton signed
the bill into law on February 8, 1996. The CDA expands the FCC's jurisdiction to encompass all advancements in all communications technology, including computers. 8 5 Although some service providers may be
exempt from its provisions, 8 6 the CDA clearly aims to stop not only unet al., Implications of the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 for Schools, Colleges, and Universities, 109 ED. LAw REP. 1051 (1996), available in 109 WELR 1051 (quoting Exon as explaining that where a university, for example, is found to be a "conspirator with a content
producer," or owns or controls a facility, system or network that is engaged in providing
prohibited information, the university could be liable under the CDA for the content of
material on their network).
85. See, e.g., § 230(e)(1) (defining "Internet"); § 230(E)(3) (defining "Information content provider"); § 223(h)(3) (defining "access software"); § 230(e)(4) (defining "Access
software provider"). See also § 223(h)(1)(defining "telecommunications device," to extent
that it does not include an "interactive computer service"). Under the CDA's provisions, the
statute would not only cover telephones, but would include all "telecommunications devices" such as computers, modems, data servers and conferencing systems used by Internet
sites and by commercial Internet access providers such as America Online, CompuServe,
and Prodigy. Electronic Frontier Foundation, ConstitutionalProblems with the Communications Decency Amendment: A Legislative Analysis by the Electronic Foundation, EFFEcTOR ONLInE, Vol. 8, No.10 (June 16, 1995) <httpJ/www.eff.org/Alerts/> (copy on file with
author) (analyzing the CDA as passed by the Senate in June, 1995).
86. See, e.g., § 223(e)(5)(A) (providing an affirmative defense if the user has taken "in
good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors" to indecent or patently offensive material, "which may
involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including
any method which is feasible under available technology"); § 223(5)(B) (exempting from
liability any individual who has restrict minor's access to "indecent" or "patently offensive"
communication through use of credit cart verification, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number); and § 223(d)(4) (exempting an employer from liability for acts outside an employee's scope of conduct). See also Salomon, supra note 84, at
1051 (explaining in detail the defenses to liability under the CDA).
In effect, the court in Shea noted that "for the vast majority of applications and services available on the Internet, a user has no way of communicating or making available
patently offensive content with certainty that the content will not reach a person under
eighteen years of age." Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 941. As that court explained,
For example, an individual sending a message that will be retransmitted by a mail
exploder program has no way of knowing the identity of other subscribers (even if
he knows the e-mail address of each subscriber). A content provider has no way of
knowing who will have access to an article posted to a Usenet newsgroup. Individual participants in an Internet Relay Chat discussion know other participants only
by the names they choose upon entering the discussion; users can participate
anonymously by using a pseudonym. A content provider who makes files available
on an anonymous FTP or on a gopher or Web server has no way of knowing the
identity of other participants who will have access to those servers.
Id.
For example, the credit card verification defense described in section 223(5)(B) is not a
plausible solution to liability because the provider of the message has no way of identifying
the recipients of the message, it would be impossible to obtain credit card or access verification of a recipient's age. Id. (finding that the credit card defense may be adequate for certain commercial providers, but that all content providers might not be able to absorb the
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protected obscenity, but protected expression as well.
The same day the CDA was enacted, the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging the constitutionality of
the provisions that ban "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech transmitted on-line.8 8 On February 15, 1996, Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter
issued a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the CDA
provision relating to "indecent" speech, finding it unconstitutionally
vague.8 9 On June 11, 1996, a three-judge panel 90 , in three separate
opinions, issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of those
sections of the CDA that prohibit the transmission of "indecent" and "pa-

cost of credit card verification, and thus, the credit card defense is no defense at all for
speakers using most Internet applications); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845-48 (explaining obstacles to age and credit card verification on the Internet).
Likewise, under section 223(e(5)(A)'s "good faith" defense, the available technology
such as tagging content; placing it on blocked directories; and registering the content on
certain directories is not a practical alternative for most Internet content providers due to
cost and universal availability of such services. See, e.g., Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 946-49
(explaining the limits associated with steps necessary for an Internet content provider to
"substantially" comply with the good faith defense outlined in section 223(e)((5)(A)); ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 864 (noting that the good faith defense does not describe, nor is there
currently available, technology available to content providers which would ensure good
faith compliance to screen harmful content).
87. According to Senator Exon, "[c]hildren should be protected from the pornography
and smut that I fear could turn the Information Superhighway into a red light district."
Coates, supra note 28, at B1. Several vocal opponents, such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich, claim that the legislation "is clearly a violation of free speech and ... a violation of the
rights of adults to communicate with each other." Swisher & Corcoran, supra note 29, at
D8.
88. CDA ChallengersEducateJurists On Unique Qualities of On-Line Medium, 1 Electronic Information Policy & Law Report 6 (BNA April 12, 1996). See also World Wide Web
Sites for the American Civil Liberties Union, <httpl/www.aclu.org>;Citizen Internet Empowerment Coalition, <http://www/cdtlorg/ciec/>; the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<httpJ/www.eff.org>; and the Electronic Privacy Information Center, <http://www/epic.
org> (providing information relating to constitutional challenges to CDA).
89. Specifically, the ACLU challenged 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 223(d).
ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL 65464, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 1996). Judge Buckwalter enjoined
enforcement of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) as it related to "indecent" but not "obscene" material. Id.
90. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883-84. Pursuant to section 561 of the CDA providing for expedited review in any civil action challenging the constitutionality of the CDA's
provisions, Delores K. Sloviter, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, convened a three-judge court, which included Judge Buckwalter and Judge
Stewart Dalzell, to begin disposition of motions. Id. The case was consolidated with a
similar action filed by the American Library Association, Inc. ("ALA"). See id. at 827 n.2
(listing plaintiffs comprising ACLU); n.3 (listing plaintiffs comprising ALA); and at 849
(noting that the plaintiffs in the action are businesses, libraries, non-commercial and notfor-profit organizations, and educational societies and consortia).
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tently offensive" material through a computer or a computer network, 9 1
finding the challenged provisions facially invalid under both the First
92
and Fifth Amendments.
Subjecting the CDA to the strict scrutiny analysis applied to "dial-aporn" telephone service regulation in Sable, the court found that the
CDA's challenged provisions-regardless of statutory defenses-failed to
use the least restrictive means to further the government's compelling
interest in protecting children from indecent material transmitted online. 93 First, the court reasoned, the CDA was a criminal statute which
carried the risk of criminal prosecution and penalties, hovering over each
content provider "like the proverbial sword of Damocles." 9 4 Second, the
CDA's statutory defenses were neither technologically nor economically
feasible for most content providers. 95 Last, the court reasoned, the statute's terms, "indecent" and "patently offensive," were inherently vague
91. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 849, 883-84. The court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of CDA §§ 223(a)(1)(B),(a)(2) finding those sections unconstitutional to the extent that they reach indecency; and finding §§ 223(dX1),(d)(2) unconstitutional on their
face. Id. at 849.
92. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
93. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851, 855-57 (Sloviter, J.) (citing Sable, 492
U.S. at 126) (reasoning that the CDA, a content-based restriction on speech, "will only be
upheld if it is justified by a compelling government interest and if it is narrowly tailored to
effectuate that interest").
Although the court acknowledged that "there is certainly a compelling government interest to shield a substantial number of minors from some of the online material that motivated Congress to enact the CDA," the CDA reached much farther. Id. at 852-55 (noting,
for example, that the Pulitzer Prize-winning broadway play, Angels in America, depicting
homosexuality and AIDS; graphic photographs from National Geographic,and information
concerning HIV-related illnesses would all be subject to the CDA's prohibitions).
Moreover, the court reasoned that the CDA's scope-which the government argued
was intended only to reach commercial pornographers-was not confined to material "that
has a prurient interest or appeal, one of the hallmarks of obscenity." Id. at 854-55. Rather,
the court reasoned, the CDA's legislative history, as well as its failure to define the terms
"patently offensive" or "indecent" evidenced an intent to reach beyond obscenity, and to
exclude material of serious value. Id. at 855. The court found that because there is "no
effective way for many Internet content providers to limit the effective reach of the CDA to
adults because there is no realistic way to ascertain the age of those accessing their materials," a necessary consequence of compliance for Internet providers was silence, rather than
prosecution. Id. at 855.
94. 929 F. Supp. at 856. Hence, the court reasoned, no content provider, "whether an
individual, non-profit corporation, or even large publicly held corporation, is likely to subject itself to itself to prosecution for a miscalculation of the prevalent community standards
or for an error in judgment as to what is indecent. Id.
95. Id. at 856. The government's hypothetical "tagging" scheme, which is dependant
upon third party software providers over which the content providers exercise no control,
likewise failed to justify the statute's "good faith" defense provided under § 223(e)(5)(A).
Id. Hence, the court reasoned, a statute is not narrowly tailored when it subjects to potential criminal penalties those who must depend upon third parties for the effective operation
of a statutory defense." Id.
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where the statutory language failed to identify the relevant community
96
by whose standards the material will be judged.
Several weeks after the Pennsylvania court found the CDA to be an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted yet another preliminary injunction against enforcement of the CDA-this time in favor of Joe Shea,
97
publisher of an electronic newspaper, the American Reporter.
Although the court failed to find the "indecency" standard in section
223(d)(2) unconstitutionally vague, the court struck down section 223(d)
in its entirety as a constitutionally overbroad restriction on adults' First
Amendment rights. 98 The Department of Justice has appealed both
cases to the Supreme Court.9 9
96. Id. at 856, 862-63 (citing Pacifica,438 U.S. at 732 (defining "indecent" by reference
to terms "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium"); DialInfo. Servs., 938 F. 2d at 1540 (defining indecency by reference to
contemporary community standards for the telephone medium)).
97. See, e.g., Shea, 930 F. Supp. 950 (striking down CDA § 223(d) as overbroad despite
the affirmative defenses stated in § 223(e) where the statute bans constitutionally protected indecent speech in violation of adults' First Amendment rights).
Shea, owner, publisher and editor of The American Reporter, challenged 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(d) as void for vagueness because the statute failed to provide ordinary citizens with
sufficient notice of what conduct will subject them to criminal liability. 930 F. Supp. at
922. In addition, Shea claimed that § 223(d) was substantially overbroad where, 1) the
statute restricted speech with "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and
that the government cannot demonstrate any compelling interest in restricting the availability of such material on the Internet," and 2) § 223(d), along with the affirmative defenses
to criminal liability set forth in § 223(e)(5), was not narrowly tailored in that it failed to
protect adults' First Amendment rights to engage in constitutionally protected "patently
offensive" speech. 930 F. Supp. at 940. In effect, the statute operated as a blanket ban on
indecent communications transmitted through a computer network. Id. See § 223(d)
(criminalizing the use of an interactive computer service to display to anyone under eighteen, sexually explicit mater that is "patently offensive" according to contemporary community standards). See also supra note 84 and accompanying text (for text of § 223(d)).
98. 930 F. Supp. at 935-37. Like the court in ACLU v. Reno, the three-judge panel in
Shea applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to the statute, and found § 223(d) overbroad as violation of adults' First Amendment rights, despite the statute's affirmative defenses. Id. at 941, 948. Again, as in ACLU v. Reno, the court found that in order to avoid
criminal liability, content providers would essentially depend upon third parties (i.e.,
software manufacturers), to provide the technological means necessary for substantial compliance with the statute's provision. Id. at 948.
However, the court failed to find § 223(d)'s term, "patently offensive," vague. Id. at
937. Unlike the court in ACLU v. Reno, the Shea court did not read Pacifica and its progeny as requiring statutory reference to a relevant "community standard." Id. at 937-38.
Hence, the lack of reference to a relevant community standard did not leave the statute
open to arbitrary enforcement as to what content was "patently offensive" where codifications of indecency "have been authoritatively construed for a variety of media in recent
years." Id. at 938-39.
99. See e.g. note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court appeal in both
ACLU v. Reno and Shea). See also CDA, § 561 (providing that any provision of the CDA
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III. ANALYSIS
Our technology inevitably expands far faster than our ability to assimilate, legislate, understand or constructively use that technology.
Proponents of legislative reform and advocates of self-regulation share a
common purpose. Both groups strive to promote free-speech on the Internet, yet they concurrently seek to mitigate the need to shield children
from offensive and potentially dangerous expression. However, the government is not the appropriate entity to regulate the content of information transmitted across Cyberspace.100 This Comment argues that
governmental regulation of the content of material transmitted through
computer networks,2 such as that imposed by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, are unnecessary, ineffective and likely
unconstitutional.
First, this section demonstrates that new laws are unnecessary to
prosecute criminals who use the Internet to target children or to control
content on the Internet which may be harmful to them. Moreover, the
technology exists for both on-line access providers and users of interactive computer systems to control the content of unwanted speech. Second, broadly worded provisions, such as those set forth in the CDA, will
likely prove ineffective to administer to the exponentially-growing
number of users of interactive computer systems. Last, the fundamental
principles behind the rationale for traditional mass media regulation of
content do not yield a similar justification for Internet regulation. Thus,
any similar imposition on computer-transmitted speech will likely fail
constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment.

found unconstitutional "shall be reviewable as a matter of right by direct appeal to the
Supreme Court").
100. Barret, supra note 19, at 106. According to Andrew Barrett, FCC Commissioner:
I am unsure that given the typical mindset in this country, many Americans would
want the FCC bureaucrats to assume a parental role for their children. Regulators need to be very careful about that; while many people want more regulation in
the mass media area, most have the opposite reaction on the telecommunications
side. While everybody wants the FCC to come into their households on the mass
media side and determine what they ought to see, when they ought to see it, and
what ought to be included as a matter of content and programming, people suggest
that there ought to be less regulation on the telecommunications side.
Barret, supra note 19, at 106. A survey conducted by Texas-based Intelliquest, a technology research company, revealed the following statistics regarding who they thought would
be the appropriate group to regulate the Internet and/or commercial on-line services: An
Internet governing body (32%); Users (32%); Private enterprise (16%); No one (15%); U.S.
government (6%). See James Kim, Internet Users Favor Self-Regulation, USA TODAY, Oct.
3, 1995 at 1A (noting a margin of error of approximately five percent).
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A. GOVERNMENT REGULATION IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE EXISTING
LAWS PROHIBIT ILLEGAL EXPRESSION, AND THE TECHNOLOGY EXISTS TO
CONTROL CONTENT OFFENSIVE TO CHILDREN, BUT CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED SPEECH AS TO ADULTS

1. Reliance on Existing Laws to Curb On-line Abuse
Prosecutors successfully utilize existing laws and judicial doctrines
to assess liability for harmful material communicated through on-line
services. Regardless of the medium through which it is transmitted, the
First Amendment does not protect the transmission or distribution of obscene expression.' 0 1 Accordingly, both federal and state governments

have implemented statutes that prohibit the transmission and distribu0
tion of obscene material through various channels of communication.1

2

101. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (reaffirming that dissemination of obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment); accord Pacifica, 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (concerning the broadcast media); Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (concerning
the telephonic audio-text); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 710-11 (6th Cir. 1995),
reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 701, pet. cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3839 (June 10, 1996) (concerning the
computer bulletin boards). See also Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973)
(concerning film); Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1158 (M.D. Ga. 1991), afld, 958
F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 964 F.2d 1148 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S.Ct. 325 (1992) (recognizing sound recording subject to obscenity analysis although work
challenged held not obscene).
102. A comprehensive list of federal statutes governs the transmission and distribution
of obscene material. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (mailing obscene or crime inciting matter); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994) (importing or transporting obscene material in interstate or
foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (broadcasting obscene language); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1465 (1994) (transporting obscene material for sale or distribution in interstate or foreign
commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994) (selling or transferring obscene material in interstate
or foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C. 1466 (1994) (engaging in the business of selling or transferring obscene matter); 18 U.S.C. 3237 (1994) (providing basis of jurisdiction for offenses
begun in one district and completed in another); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994) (prohibiting use of
the telephone for obscene or harassing interstate or foreign communication). For example,
federal prosecutors used 18 U.S.C. § 1465, which broadly prohibits the transportation of
obscene material in interstate or foreign commerce, to apprehend individuals who transmit
obscenity via a computer network. See, supra text and accompany notes 106-14 (discussing
federal conviction for transmission of obscene materials through a computer network in
U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (1996)).
Of the various state obscenity laws, approximately 45 of the 50 states have some type
of obscenity statute. Robert A. Jacobs, Dirty Words, Dirty Thoughts and Censorship: Obscenity Law and Non-PictorialWorks, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 155, *16, *62 n.111 (1992) (providing comparative listing of state obscenity laws). See also, e.g., J. Todd Metcalf, Obscenity
Prosecutions in Cyberspace: The Miller Test Cannot 'Go Where No [Porn]Has Gone Before',
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 481, 532 n.51 (1996) (listing 35 states with statutes proscribing the distribution or transportation of obscene materials). Georgia, for example, in 1993 enacted a
statute directly addressing the computer transmission of obscenity to a minor. See GA. ST.
ANN. § 16-12-100.1 (1993) (electronically furnishing obscene material to minors). Of the
five states without adult obscenity laws, Maine, New Mexico and South Dakota allow local
obscenity ordinances. Bruce Taylor, Hard-CorePornography:A Proposalfor a PerSe Rule,
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Child pornography, by definition "obscene," has been a target of significant legal regulation long before the Internet offered a medium for transmitting such material.1 0 3 Hence, it is as much a violation of the law to
provide obscenity or child pornography to minors on-line as it is to sell
04
children pornography at the local bookstore.'
The federal statutory prohibition against the transmission of obscene material has been effectively applied to speech transmitted
21 U. MICH. J.L. RE~foRM 255, 260-262 n.39 (1987-88) (noting that most states' obscenity
statutes have uniformly codified the "Community Standards" test set forth in Miller v. California, 423 U.S. 15 (1973)). See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the "Community Standards" test formulated in Miller.
Only Vermont and Alaska have no adult obscenity laws. Taylor, supra, at 262 n.39.
However, Vermont provides for criminal penalties for the dissemination of indecent materials to minors. 13 V.S.A. §§ 2802, 2804b (West 1994).
103. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (holding that a state may
regulate child pornography within bounds of First Amendment if statute narrowly tailored
to achieve compelling objective of protecting minors); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 100, 109
(1990) (upholding Ohio Statute which criminalizes possession, production, and dissemination of child pornography as serving compelling state interest in protection minors).
The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. 2251-2258 (1994), defines child pornography as any "visual depiction" of children involved in "sexually explicit
conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2), (5). Under section 2251, it is a federal crime to advertise,
offer, or seek the sale, exchange, reproduction, or distribution of child pornography "by any
means including a computer". 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)(2)(b). Section 2252 specifically applies
to on-line systems and computer bulletin boards, and imposes liability for knowing receipt
of distribution of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq. (1994). See also United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 464, 471-72 (1994) (holding that the term
"knowingly" applies not only to the mode of transportation, but also to the sexually explicit
nature of the material and to the age of the performers in material prohibited by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). See also Val Ellicott and Mitch McKenney Cox, Tempe
Man's Computer Files Helped Break Child Porn Ring, PHOENIX GAZETTE, February 17,

1995, at A14 (an elementary and a middle school teacher in Florida charged with exchanging pornography in interstate commerce after using America OnLine to transmit and receive child pornography). At the international level, U.S. Customs officials have
corroborated with foreign criminal investigative organizations to combat Internet child pornography. See Craig Menefee, U.S. Customs Warns Against Kid Porn on BBSs, NEwsBmrEs, Nov. 28, 1994 (describing U.S. Customs' involvement with law enforcement
agencies in Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, and the United Kingdom to
investigate computer bulletin boards used to distribute child pornography). But see Scheller, supra note 40 (examining potential inadequacies of current legislation in regulating
computer-created images of child pornography).
All 50 states have passed legislation banning child pornography. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, § 5/111-20.1 (Smith-Hurd 1994) (listing comparative child pornography laws

of forty-eight states). In addition, several states have revised their statutes to specifically
include computer transmission of child pornography. See, e.g., The Computer Pornography
and Child Prevention Exploitation Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 847.0135 (1994) (proscribing child
pornography via computer); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.681(1) (1991) (prohibiting computer portrayals of sexually explicit conduct by children).
104. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state statutes regulating the transmission of obscenity and child pornography).
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through a computer network.' 0 5 In United States v. Thomas, 10 6 one of
the most infamous Cyperspace cases that involved transmission of pornographic and obscene material on-line, computer bulletin board operators were convicted under federal statute l0 7 of ten counts of transmitting
sexually obscene pictures through interstate phone lines. 0 8s A United
States Postal inspector discovered the Thomas' California-based bulletin
board service ("BBS"), Amateur Action, after he received a complaint
from a fellow Tennessee resident about the graphic images. 10 9 The defendants were tried before a jury in Memphis, Tennessee, where the
images were received, rather than in California where the material
originated. 110 The Thomases were acquitted of the child pornography
charges. But the Memphis jury, applying existing federal statutes which
prohibit the transportation of obscene materials, found the images ob105. In his May 6, 1995 letter to Rep. Thomas Bliley, the American Family Association's
Patrick Trueman, the Section Chief during the Bush and Reagan Administrations of the
Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Justice Department, noted that the Federal Criminal Code currently prohibits distribution of both child pornography and obscenity by computer. Child Pornographyon the Internet, 1995: Hearing on S. 892 Before the
Committee on the Judiciaryof the Senate, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995)(written testimony
of William W. Burrington, Assist. General Counsel, America OnLine and Chairman of the
Online Policy Comm. on Interactive Services Assoc., at note 2) [hereinafter Burrington
Written Testimony]. According to Kent Markus, the Acting Assist Attorney General for the
United States Department of Justice, the Department's Criminal Division has applied current federal law and successfully prosecuted violations of federal child pornography and
obscenity laws which were perpetrated with computer technology. See 141 CONG. REC.
S8342 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)(letter from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Senator Patrick Leahy) [hereinafter Dept. of Justice
Letter] (explaining position on the Communications Decency Act of 1995).
106. 74 F.3d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1996).
107. The Thomases were convicted of criminal penalties under Title 18 of the United
States Code, which prohibits the transportation of obscene material for sale or distribution
and provides in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly transports in ... interstate or foreign commerce.
for the
purpose of sale or distribution,.., of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book,
pamphlet, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image,
cast, pornographic recording, electrical transcription ... or any other matter of
indecent or immoral character, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned ....
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
108. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706. The defendants, Robert and Carleen Thomas, operated
the board "Amateur Action" from their home in Milipitas, California. Id. at 705. Only
Amateur Action subscribers had direct access to the files. Id. In order to subscribe, members were required to fill out a form which included age and a signature, as well as pay the
fee. Id. The board featured adults engaged in various sexual acts, including images of
bestiality, and sexually explicit scenes with children. Id. See also Rimm, supra note 17, at
1896-1905 (discussing in detail the content of "Amateur Action" computer bulletin board
operated by the Thomases).
109. Id. 705. Under an assumed name, he obtained access to the board and downloaded
the images onto his computer. Id.
110. Id. at 706.
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scene based on the Tennessee community's standards.'
On appeal, the Thomases argued, inter alia, that section 1465, which
prohibits transportation of obscene materials in interstate commerce for
the purpose of sale or distribution, did not apply to intangible objects
such as computer files. 112 Moreover, the Thomases argued that Con111. Henry J. Reske, Computer Porn a ProsecutorialChallenge, 80 A.BA. J. 40 (1994).
See also supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing obscenity analysis based on "contemporary community standards" set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
Hence, the prosecutors were accused of forum shopping on the basis that the convictions
would have been unlikely in California where similar sexually explicit material could easily
be acquired in the streets in neighboring San Francisco. Reske, supra. See also Anthony L.
Clapes, 13 No. 7. COMPUTER LAw. 1, *8-9 (1996) (discussing the application of the federal
obscenity statute to on-line communications in Thomas, noting that the court "had little
trouble concluding that the federal obscenity statute covered on-line services," prior to the
passage of the CDA).
Ultimately, Robert Thomas was convicted of eleven counts under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to violate federal obscenity laws); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (shipping obscene video tapes);
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (knowingly using and causing to be used a facility and means of interstate
commerce-computer and telephone lines-to transport obscene, computer-generated
materials in interstate commerce); and 18 U.S.C. § 1467 (forfeiture). 74 F.3d at 705-06.
Carleen Thomas was convicted of the same offenses except that under 18 U.S.C. § 1467. Id.
After Thomas, the absence of a uniform standard of obscenity may be a consideration
for the bulletin board operator who chooses to distribute sexually explicit material nationwide. Although beyond the scope of this discussion, the application of local community
standards to the Cyberspace community has fostered criticism regarding the appropriateness of the current analysis set forth in Miller when applied to cases such as this. However, a wholesale revision of the law may not be required, but rather re-evaluation of the
existing judicial doctrine. Among the solutions introduced by practitioners:
It is easy to image a situation where a user posts something on his bulletin board
which might be wholly appropriate in his own community, but is viewed as obscene when downloaded in some distant, unknown (and perhaps unforeseeable)
community. The result is that it is no longer sufficient to adhere to the standards
of one's own local community. When conversing on-line, the strictest community
may provide the ultimate worldwide standard for review.
Samuel Fifer and Michael R. Lufrano, The Law Grapples With On-line Defamation, 1995
A.B.A. SEC. SCL & TECH. 29, n.28. Thus, "[o]nce the material is on the Internet, it is fair
game for readers worldwide and legal claims are fair wherever the sender's message happens to be pulled down." Fifer and Lufrano, supra. See also Pamela A. Huelster, Cybersex
and Community Standards, 75 B.U.L. REV. 865 (1995)(advocating the use of a single national obscenity standard for computer bulletin board services).
Moreover, although the prosecution successfully convicted the Thomases under existing laws, cases such as this have highlighted the Cyberspace community's practical need
for "legal alternatives that permit such groups to exclude from their communities offensive
text as well as graphical images." Anne Wells Branscomb, Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornographyon the Information Superhighway Reveal a Threat to
the Stability of Society, 83 GEo. L.J. 1935, 1948 (1995)(discussing implications of the current obscenity test on the Cyberspace community and examining alternative legal and
technical tools available to the Cyberspace community to restrict pornographic traffic online).
112. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706. The Thomases relied on the Tenth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Carlin Commun., Inc, 815 F.2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1987), for the propo-
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gress did not intend to regulate computer transmissions, as evidenced by
the absence of express language prohibiting such conduct. 1 13 The Sixth
Circuit rejected both arguments, concluding that the federal obscenity
114
statute applied to on-line services such as the Thomas' BBS.
The utility of Thomas is the Sixth Circuit's reasoning for broadening
the applicability of section 1465 to encompass material transmitted by
computer. 115 The "manner and form" in which the images were transferred, the court reasoned, failed to address the fact that the ultimate
result was still a tangible image-the obscene files received on the
screen, then downloaded on the computer in Tennessee. 116 Moreover,
the court found that section 1465 should be liberally construed, because
the prohibited conduct fell within the plain language of the statute, and
Congress clearly intended "to stem the transportation of obscene material in interstate commerce regardless of the means used to effect that
117
end."
State prosecutors have likewise utilized existing law to curb illegal
activity targeting minors. 1 18 In People v. Poplaski,1 19 a New York court
sition that the sections 1462 and 1465 applied only to tangible objects, not the intangible
string of 0's and l's of the Thomas' computer files. Id. at 706-07. Moreover, the Thomases
argued that they were prosecuted under the wrong statute, and that 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
(1988 & Supp V 1993), which prohibited the use of telephone facilities to transport obscene
material, would apply to the conduct in question, if at all. Id. at 707.
113. Id. at 706.
114. Id. at 707-09.
115. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706-09.
116. Id. at 707 (reasoning that "[the manner in which the images moves does not affect
their ability to be viewed on a computer screen in Tennessee or their ability to be printed
out in hard copy in that distant location"). Ironically, the Thomas court, which decided the
case only two weeks prior to the enactment of the CDA, likewise found that 47 U.S.C. § 223
applied to only sexually-explicit, commercial telephone services, not to "commercial computer bulletin boards that use telephone facilities for the purpose of transmitting obscene,
computer-generated images to approved members." Id.
117. Id. at 709 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 580 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App.
1995) (holding that "[tihe use of the terms 'distribution,' 'picture,' 'image,' and 'electrical
transcription' leads us to the inescapable conclusion the statute is fully applicable to the
activities engaged in").
118. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing state obscenity and
child pornography statutes). Although not dispositive of all cases prosecuted under relevant state statutes, the following provides a sample of successful convictions of illegal activity focusing on minors: see Computer Pedophile Link Feared, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 7,
1994, at A05 (discussing the arrest of a New York computer analyst and subsequent charging of second-degree sexual contact with a minor, initiated through a computer chat-group);
Mary Murphy, Computer ProwlersStalk Kids; Nowadays, It Seems Everything is Done by
Computer - Including Child Molestation, A Special Agent Discovers, THE ORLANDo SENT.,
July 9, 1995, at 1 (discussing Florida Department of Law Enforcement efforts to track down
child molesters who search for victims in Cyberspace); Dennis McCafferty, Georgian Accused of Going On Line To FindMolestation Victims, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 4, 1995, at
3B (discussing charges brought against 48-year-old Georgia resident for attempted child
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1 20
upheld a state statute criminalizing acts which endangered children.
Poplaski, who used a computer bulletin board to locate and engage young
boys in sexually explicit conversation, claimed that the statute violated
his First Amendment rights. 12 1 Rejecting Poplaski's argument, the
court found that the legislature's intent to protect the physical health,
morals, and well-being of children a compelling government interest
which outweighed Poplaski's right to engage in sexually explicit phone
conversations with children.1 2 2 Thomas, the prosecution successfully utilized existing law as a vehicle through which to target computer crime
against minors. 12 3 Absent sexually explicit conversation, current law
likewise prohibits potentially harmful encounters associated with on-line
stalking and harassment. 12 4 Hence, where illegal conduct affects chil-

molestation and attempted child physical abuse after answering false computer ad posted
by Naval Criminal Investigative Service); Julio Moran, Man Accused of Possessing Child
Porn from Internet, L.A. Tndrs, July 18, 1995, at 1A (discussing arrest of California resident for possession of child pornography downloaded from Internet onto home computer);
Scott Bowles, Man Guilty of Rape in Net Case; Computer Contact Led to Sex With Girl, 12,
THE WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1995, at D06 (28-year-old man sentenced to one to three years in
Pennsylvania prison for having sex with 12-year-old girl met through computer chat room);
Christopher Quinn, Man Used Computer to Seduce Maryland Teen, ORLANDO SENT., Aug.
29, 1995, at C1 (discussing arrest and subsequent sexual assault charges brought against
40-year old Florida man for allegedly raping 15-year-old girl met through computer chat
line); Peter H. Lewis, "Sting"on Internet Leads to a Child Sex Case, N.Y. TiaEs, July 14,
1995, Sect. A at 21 (noting arrest of Nevada man charged with crossing state lines with the
intention of having sex with 14-year-old girl met through computer network).
119. 616 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. Crim Ct. 1994).
120. Id. at 438. Under New York Penal Law § 260. 10(1), "a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when he knowing acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the
physical, mental or moral welfare of a male child less than seventeen years old." Id.
121. Id. at 436. Poplaski allegedly contacted six boys, ages twelve to fifteen, through a
computer bulletin board. Id. After locating the boys, Poplaski would call them, and attempt to hypnotize and to direct them to masturbate. Id. Poplaski claimed that the statute
applied only to acts, not speech. Id.
122. Id. at 436-37.
123. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Thomas).
124. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting that
the Supreme Court has defined certain classes of speech which the government may regulate, including the obscene, the profane, the libelous and fighting words. Federal law currently provides criminal penalties for the interstate transmission of any communication
which threatens or intends to threaten injury to another person. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
See also 47 U.S.C. § 223(aX)(1XC) (1994) (prohibiting use of the telephone to "annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person").
Under federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), FBI agents arrested
and charged Abraham Jacob Alkhabaz (aka Jake Baker), a 20-year-old University of Michigan student, for transporting allegedly obscene and threatening material across state lines.
United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Baker, who published a
sexually violent work of fiction about a classmate on the "alt.sex.stories" newsgroup, was
discovered when a Michigan alumnus alerted the school administrators. Branscomb, supra
note 14, at 1653 n.48. According to Magistrate Thomas A. Carlson of the Detroit Federal
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dren, either as the object of the crime or the viewer of illegal material,
25
current laws appear adequate to curb abuse.1
2.

Technology Exists to Identify and Filter Out Objectionable Material

Second, legislation such as the CDA which prohibits indecent
speech, not only seeks to prohibit unprotected expression, but that which
is shielded by the First Amendment as well.' 2 6 Intrusive government
restriction controlling the content of protected expression is unnecessary
because self-regulation over unwanted content is a viable alternative.
The viability of self-regulation embodies two general principles. First,
current technology enables users of interactive services to identify unwanted content, and to filter the contents receipt. Second, the Cyberspace community has shown the impetus to implement these controls.
District Court, even though Baker never approached or spoke to the classmate, "his writings were deemed the work of a dangerous, disturbed man who may have the potential to
cause harm." Branscomb, supra note 14, at 1653 n.48.
"Stalking" focuses on a repeated pattern of pursuit involving a specific victim, rather
than focusing on actual physical contact. Eileen S. Ross, E-Mail Stalking: Is Adequate
Legal ProtectionAvailable, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 405, 405 n.2 (1995)
(providing a comprehensive list of state statutes that criminalize stalking and proposing
that state statutes should be updated to include electronic communication as a type of "unconsented contact"). Approximately 48 states and the District of Columbia enacted antistalking statutes and also provide criminal penalties for various forms of threatening communication. See id. at 409-10 n.29.
125. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57. In ACLU v. Reno, the court noted
that "[v]igorous enforcement of current obscenity and child pornography laws" should sufficiently address the problem of children's exposure to patently unsuitable material on the
Internet." See id. (citing 141 Cong.Rec. S8342 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (letter from Kent
Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Senator
Leahy)).
"To the extent that particular gaps may appear in the future, or if any obstacles arise
to prosecution of those who make obscenity or indecency available to minors, Congress
should examine whether there is a need for additional training or additional resources for
enforcement of the current laws." Written Testimony of William Burrington, supra note
105 at n.2.
Moreover, according to the Department of Justice, broadly worded legislation appears
premature. Dept. of Justice Letter, supra note 105. The Department of Justice recommended instead "that a comprehensive review be undertaken of current laws and law enforcement resources for prosecuting online obscenity and child pornography, and the
technical means available to parents and users to control the commercial and noncommercial communications they receive over interactive telecommunications systems." Dept. of
Justice Letter, supra note 105.
126. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (holding that offensive words subject to constitutional
protection, and only in certain limited context is regulation permissible); Sable, 492 U.S. at
126 (1989) (holding that sexual expression which is indecent, but not obscene, protected by
First Amendment; and the Government can only regulate content in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest).
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As the history of mass media reveals, members of professions or
127
trades are often instrumental in developing self-regulatory codes.
Whether through a desire to avoid government regulation, or to improve
the public image of the industry, self-regulation has proven effective for
such media as the motion picture industry and video retailers. 128 Likewise, Internet service providers and users have shown potential ability
29
to provide alternative methods of controlling harmful content.1
127. JOHN ELLMORE, BROADCASTING LAW AND REGULATION 259 (1982).

128. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the motion picture industry's
success at self-regulation of content through MPAA ratings). Accordingly, nationwide polls
conducted each year by the Opinion Research Corporation, Princeton, New Jersey, have
consistently reveal that the system is successful. See VALENTI, supra note 6, at 8. A recent
poll suggests that 74% of parents with children under the age of 18 found the rating to be
"very useful" to "fairly useful."
Likewise, under the threat of impending legislation, the video software industry proposed to develop a rating system for violent or sexually explicit material contained in some
video games. See 140 CONG.REc. S788 (daily ed. Jan 25, 1994) (statement of Senator
Liebermann). See also Video Game Rating Act of 1994, S. 1823, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (bill providing for establishment of"Interactive Entertainment Rating Commission"
as independent agency in connection with video game industry to create a system for providing purchasers with information about graphic violence or sexually explicit material

contained in video games).
129. For example, prior to enactment of the CDA, the Interactive Services Association
("ISA"), a non-profit association which serves providers of telecommunications interactive
services, took the initiative in developing alternatives to legislation. The ISA proposed, in
connection with Congress, to develop technical tools for parents to screen out objectionable
content. Written Testimony of William Burrington,supra note 105. ISA's Online Operators
Policy Committee is comprised of: America Online, Inc.; Apple e-World; CompuServe; Delphi Internet Services Corp.; GEnie; Interchange Network Company; MCI; Microsoft Network; Prodigy Services Company; and Ziff Davis Interactive. Written Testimony of William
Burrington,supra note 105, at n.1. See also Internet Access: ITAA Announces Internet Project on Industry Self-Regulation, EDGE, ON & ABOUT AT&T, July 3, 1995 at 21(1) [hereinafter Internet Access] (noting that the Task Force on Internet Use of the Information
Technology Association of America (ITAA), representing over 6700 United States computer
software, service, and communications companies, instituted a study of alternatives for
industry self-regulation for recommendation to Congress); Patrick McKenna, Microsoft/
Netscape Plan Parental"Lock Out" Ability, NEWSBYTES, June 15, 1995 at NEW06150029
(announcing joint effort by Microsoft, Netscape Communications, and Progressive Networks to "create and implement" an industry-wide standards agreement which allows parents to lock out access to inappropriate material).
At present, the World Wide Web Consortium has instituted the "Platform for Internet
Content Selection" ("PICS"), a program to develop "technical standards that would support
parents' ability to filter and screen material that their children see on the Web." See, e.g.,
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838-39. The participants include major on-line service providers, commercial internet access providers, hardware and software companies, major internet content providers, and consumer organizations, with membership constantly
growing. Id. at 839 (noting that PICS members have agreed to technical standards which
would allow the Internet community to begin to offer products and services based on the
PICS-standards).
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Voluntary Ratings of Content

At present, the Cyberspace community has several alternatives with
which to shield minors from offensive content. To begin with, commercial on-line services offer monitored discussion forums in order to assure
that the content of the discussion is appropriate for children.' 3 0 Accordingly, courts recognize that the market will support services which as13 1
sume this responsibility.
In addition, independent organizations offer Internet "ratings systems," 13 2 which identify content of objectionable Internet sites. 133 The
130. Prodigy Services Company, for example, labels itself as a "family oriented computer network," exercising editorial control over the content of messages posted on its bulletin boards. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5-6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (noting that "[bly actively utilizing technology and manpower
to delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and 'bad
taste'... Prodigy is clearly making decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute
editorial control"). CompuServe also provides its users with the option of completely blocking Internet access, or merely blocking unwanted content to specific areas. ACLU v. Reno,
929, F. Supp. at 842.
131. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL at *5. See also Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9,
at 1637 (noting that the service providers' decision to assume editorial control by screening
content is based on desire to attract customers who want such a service, whereas other online services offer unmoderated discussion based on similar customer demand).
132. See Internet Access, supra note 129, at 21(1) (noting that a ratings system may
identify the many, varied Internet publishers, from "individuals, to religious groups, to
universities, to large corporations ... as well as to the format selected," such as a World
Wide Web page, chat room, or usenet group).
133. For instance, computer communications contain "headers," which could contain information identifying the subject matter of the content. Headers are identification data,
designating the "host" computer (which connects individual users to other users) as well as
the particular computer attached to the host. JOHN R. LEvnE AND CAROL BARoUDI, THE
INTERNET FOR DummEs 53-58 (2d ed. 1994). See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1633
(describing header as the digital analogue to a bibliographic entry that describes a book or
magazine).
"SafeSurf," a private interest group, originally developed one of the most comprehensive systems for blocking content through use of header identification. Ray Soular and
Wendy Simpson, SafeSurf Home Page: The SafeSurf Internet Rating Standard, (visited
Oct. 1995) <http'//www.safesurf.com/ssplan.html> (copy on file with author) [hereinafter
SafeSurf Rating]. Under SafeSurf's approach to rating content of objectionable Internet
sites, children would access the Internet using individual passwords. Id. Based on the
premise that the majority of Internet sites are directed toward adult viewers, children
would only be able to access sites labeled "appropriate for children." Id. Conversely, sites
failing to contain the mark would not be accessible. Id. Moreover, Internet sites containing adult material, whether voluntarily labeled or not, will be inaccessible to children. Id.
Since the system requires Cyberspace users and web site operators to incorporate the identification code into the header file of the document, children would be denied access to files
lacking such codes. SafeSurf Rating, supra. Likewise, the SafeSurf Rating Standard
utilizes several levels of blocking based on parental approval of content for children of different ages. SafeSurf Rating, supra. For example, the actual ratings system proposes a
series of codes from "0," which contains no adult themes, to "9," which designates adult
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ratings systems are designed to work in connection with filtering
software, which blocks the identified, unwanted material.' 3 4 The most
comprehensive attempt at present is the World Wide Web Consortium, a
cross section of commercial, private and non-profit organizations, which
developed the "Platform for Internet Content Selection" ("PICS")1 5 in
36
order to rate Internet sites for content.1
However, a uniform rating system, such as that adopted by the motion picture industry, may not be appropriate for providers of such services or desirable for users.137 For example, a single rating system would
themes requiring parental caution. SafeSurf Rating, supra. Generally, the code number
describes the type of information contained at that site, which includes codes containing
profanity, violence, various sexual themes, racial, and religious content. SafeSurfRating,
supra. (describing in detail the content described by codes "1" through "9").
134. See SafeSurfRating,supra note 133 (noting that the SafeSurfInternet Rating System is designed to work in connection with third party filtering software). Various companies have marketed software which allows parents to limit children's Internet access,
including Cyber Patrol, Cybersitter, The Internet Filter, Net Nanny, Parental Guidance,
Surfwatch, Netscape Proxy Server, and WebTrack. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 839.
For example, Surfwatch, a software product which allows the user to filter unwanted content on the Internet, is available at retail locations and is compatible with both Apple Macintosh and Microsoft Windows operating systems. Id. at 841.
135. See, e.g., supra note 129 (describing various Internet-related members involved in
PICS).
136. The World Wide Web Consortium through its PICS organization, according to the
ACLU v. Reno court, intends to provide "parents with the ability to choose from a variety of
rating services, or a combination of services." 929 F. Supp. at 838. By using PICS compatible software offered through several commercial software providers such as Microsystems'
"Cyber Patrol," PICS is current functioning as a "positive" rating system, or a site inclusion
list. Id. at 839 (noting that "[tihe default configuration for a PICS compatible Internet
application will be to block access to all sites which have not been rated by a PICS rating
service, while allowing access to sites which have a PICS rating for appropriate content").
Microsystems' Cyber Patrol, which was the first parental empowerment application to
be compatible with the PICS standard, offered the first PICS ratings server on the Internet
in February, 1996. Id. at 840. Cyber Patrol is available to CompuServe and Prodigy subscribers free-of-charge, or can be purchased directly from Microsystems or retail outlets.
Id.
The CyberNOT list contains twelve categories for parents to choose from when blocking access, including material containing the following content: Violence/Profanity; Partial
Nudity; Nudity; Sexual Acts; Gross Depictions (graphic or text); Racism/Ethnic Impropriety; Satanic/Cult; Militant/Extremist; Gambling-, Questionable/Illegal; Alcohol, Beer &
Wine. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 840 (describing in detail the CyberNOT categories incorporating the PICS rating).
137. In reality, computer bulletin boards are easily established, thus rendering a nationwide rating system virtually impossible to monitor. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. at 856 (noting that at present, there is no uniform rating system that is technologically nor economically feasible for all Internet content providers). See also Becker, supra
note 8, at 207 (noting that computer bulletin boards range from large commercial services
to individual systems which have only a few users, and "[t]he smaller systems go up and
down literally on an hourly basis").
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simply replace government censorship over content with a private
scheme of censorship. 138 Instead, the variety of existing options for identifying objectionable, but highly subjective, content provides a workable
solution for all users.13 9 Hence, parents could choose the service provider whom they trust, or personally supervise content, rather than depend on a single entity's judgment as to a uniform system of appropriate
content. 140
b.

FilteringSoftware

Once identified, existing technology enables users to access or exclude offensive Internet sites. 14 1 Internet service providers and third
party organizations provide filtering software which allow the user to
42
block access to graphics as well as specific fies and programs.'
138. See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1633.
139. See also Child Pornographyon the Internet: Hearings on Cyberporn and Children,
the Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology and the Need for CongressionalAction
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 24, 1995) (statement of
Senator Leahy) [hereinafter Testimony of Sen. Leahy] (noting that "[p]arents know their
children better than any government official, and are in the best position to know the sort
of on-line material to which their children may be exposed").
140. See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1633. (proposing that flexibility provided
by interactive technology conducive to more than one rating system). See also Testimony of
Sen. Leahy, supra note 135 (noting that interested organizations, such as the Christian
Coalition or Mothers Against Drunk Driving, could provide users that implement blocking
technology with lists of Internet sites that these groups consider inappropriate for
children).
141. See supranotes 133, 142 and accompanying text (listing companies that provide for
sale filtering software to users to screen unwanted content). Child Pornography on the
Internet: Hearings on Cyberporn and Children, the Scope of the Problem, the State of the
Technology and the Need for CongressionalAction Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 24, 1995) (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director of
the Center for Democracy and Technology) [hereinafter Berman Statement]. According to
Berman, the user can could control or "filter" content in two ways:
First, one could screen out all messages or programs based on information in the
header. If a parent wanted to prevent a child from seeing a particular movie or
from participating in a particular on-line discussion group, then the computer or
other information appliance used by the child could be set by the parent to screen
out the objectionable content. Such features can often be protected with passwords which would be assigned, for example, by the responsible adults in the
house. Second, the same systems can be used to enable blocking of content based
on third party rating systems.
Id.
142. Several major online services currently provide filtering software, in connection
with service access, for use with personal computers. For example, America OnLine
("AOL") provides separate accounts for each household member, but the master account
has access to all subsidiary accounts. See Nancy Tamosaitis, ParentalDiscretionAdvised,
COMPUTER LrFE, Nov. 1994, at 163 (discussing access controls provided by on-line commercial service providers). Moreover, AOL's Parental Control feature offers instant message
blockage which stops other members from contacting children as well as prohibits children

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

90

[Vol. XV

Although the First Amendment generally protects violent content,1143
44
current technology would enable the user to screen for such material.
B.

LEGISLATION CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF SPEECH ON THE
INTERNET MAY BE INEFFECTIVE TO POLICE AND TO ADMINISTER

Regulation attempting to control the content of speech on the Internet would likely prove ineffective to administer on a global computer
network. There are no effective means to police United States laws
146
worldwide. 14 5 Because the Internet has no central controlling body,
but consists of smaller, interconnecting networks through which to hide
the origin of a message, the source of the material may be impossible to
from sending messages; stops children's access to adult-oriented chat rooms; and blocks
access to special interest conference rooms. Prodigy provides filtering software along with
individual household accounts. Id. The software screens bulletin board messages and returns obscene or sexually explicit messages to the writer. Id. CompuServe provides no
subsidiary accounts, but will block access to certain chat areas on request. Id.
Other organizations that do not provide on-line Internet access have also developed
filtering software. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 839-42 (describing third party
software available to block content).
143. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508-10 (1948) (holding that First
Amendment protects pictures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime). Accord
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the sale or rental to minors of videos depicting violence
and requiring display videos in separate areas within stores); American Booksellers Assoc.
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that television violence is protected
speech); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F. Supp. 306, 394 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (holding that
material containing only violence awarded highest degree of First Amendment Protection).
144. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 840. For example, Microsystems'
CyberNOT, which incorporates the PICS rating standards, offers software to screen violent
or politically extreme content. Id.
145. See Shawn P. McCarthy, They Rate Movies of "Decency." Why Not Rate the In.
ternet?, GovERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, Apr. 17, 1995, at 52. (noting that language of Communications Decency Act does not take into account the ways information can travel
internationally). There are border issues as well. See also Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 12, at
38 (noting that other countries on the Internet are probably no more interested in having
their messages screened by U.S. censors "than Americans would be in having theirs
screened by, say, the government of Saudi Arabia").
146. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838. The court in ACLU v. Reno succinctly described the structure of the Internet:
The Web was designed so that organizations with computers containing information can become part of the Web simply by attaching their computers to the Internet and running appropriate World Wide Web software. No single
organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the
Web. From a user's perspective, it may appear to be a single, integrated system,
but in reality it has no centralized control point.
Id. See also Richard Morin, Anarchy and Control, UNIX REvIEw, June 1995, at 83 (noting
that the Internet's only controlling body is limited to registration of IP addresses and DNS
domains).
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track. 14 7 Thus, the potential for anonymity sharply reduces the original
speaker's personal responsibility for harmful content. 148 Moreover,
under legislation such as the CDA, liability for failure to screen all
messages could revert to the systems operator of the service, rather than
the speaker. 149 In such a case, the legislation's broadly-worded language
would prove impractical for systems operators to administer.' 5 0 Thus,
147. "For technical reasons, it is extremely difficult to stamp out anything on the Internet-particularly images stored on the Usenet newsgroups. As Internet pioneer John
Gilmore famously put it, 'The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it."
Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 12, at 38. See also Dan Farber, Legislative Folly: Rules in
Cyberspace, PCWEEK, June 19, 1995, at 126 (noting that in many instances, the legal system is incapable of keeping the hordes of clever programmers across the globe from foreign
messages or sending them anonymously on the Internet); Paul Merenbloom, Internet Legislation May Add Lan Cop to the CorporateIS Manager'sJob Title, INFO. WORLD, June 26,
1995, at 63 (explaining that any capable computer hacker can find elusive ways to hide the
material's true address-noting that even a "12 year-old with a text editor can easily manipulate the contents of a Simple Network Management Protocol mailer to alter the addressing and/or contents of the mail").
148. See Fifer and Lufrano, supra note 111, at 38 (noting that if the speaker cannot be
located, "the aggrieved target, unable to seek redress from the bulletin board operator or
others involved in the process, may be left without a remedy"). See also Branscomb, supra
note 14, at 1645 (noting that "[i]f one cannot hold the poster of an abusive message responsible, because it is anonymous or the poster is judgment proof, the defendant must be the
provider of the electronic space containing the message ... [plotential litigants and their
legal counsel have not hesitated to seek the source of the deepest pockets").
149. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (discussing general liability under
the CDA). Under the current regulatory scheme, even board operators who act as a conduit
for other's material with a minimal amount of knowledge that anyone who uses the bulletin
board may transmit prohibited language to a minor may be subject to criminal penalties.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a), (d) (providing criminal penalties under CDA if systems operator allows another whom the operator knows may transmit indecent material to a minor).
See Farber, supra note 147, at 126 (explaining that under the CDA, corporations might also
be liable if individuals use the corporate network and e-mail system to post messages that
contain offensive content that could be read by a minor).
Thus, proposed legislation may conflict with existing legal standards for accountability. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959) (holding that bookseller could
not reasonably be expected to oversee all material it offered for sale and recognizing that
imposition of such strict requirements would violate First Amendment); accord Cubby Inc.
v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that mere distributor of defamatory material not liable for defamation and "has no duty to monitor each issue
of every periodical it distributes").
150. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 865 (finding that "individuals attempting
to comply with the [CDA] presently have no clear indication of what actions will ensure
that they will be insulated from criminal sanctions"). See also McCarthy, supra note 145,
at 53 (noting that the CDA omits description of the obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
indecent content it prohibits, thus computer network operators may be unable to determine
what is acceptable); Merenbloom, supra note 147, at 63 (noting that if an individual discovers holes in another's Internet site, and uses it as a posting center for indecent material,
then the systems operator will risk liability unless he explicitly documents that he is reviewing the content of the material passing through his host gateway").
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under threat of liability, operators would arbitrarily choose to omit legal,
15 1
as well as illegal, expression.
Moreover, legislation such as the CDA will likely conflict with existing laws and judicial doctrines. 15 2 First, legislation imposing criminal
sanctions on the transmission of constitutionally protected speech conflicts with existing judicial doctrines. 153 Second, the imposition of criminal liability might force a systems operator to monitor not only the
content of their bulletin boards and Internet chat areas, but also private
e-mail postings in violation of federal law.' 5 4 Thus, the legislature's attempts to change language in existing statutes may not only prove unconstitutional, 15 5 but would contravene current attempts to prosecute

151. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855 (finding that the CDA reaches speech
subject to the full protection of the First Amendment, including a broad range of material
from contemporary films, plays, books, and controversial contemporary art). See also Morin, supra note 146, at 83 (noting that prohibition to include on-line access to indecent
material would require service providers to purge alleged indecent material from public
bulletin boards and discussion groups to avoid accidental viewing by a minor); Joe Abernathy, Feds Target the Internet, PCWoRLD, May 1995, at 68 (noting that if subjected to criminal liability or regulatory burdens, many businesses might disconnect Internet service).
152. Dept. of Justice Letter, supra note 105.
153. Dept. of Justice Letter, supra note 105 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding
that restrictions on the content of protected speech in media other than broadcast must
serve compelling state interest using the "least restrictive means")). Accordingly, the CDA
"fails to take into account less restrictive alternatives utilizing existing and emerging technologies. .. ." Dept. of Justice Letter, supra note 105. Moreover, the CDA would "jeopardize the enforcement of the existing dial-a-porn statute by inviting additional constitutional
challenges, with the concomitant diversion of law enforcement resources." Dept. of Justice
Letter, supra, note 105.
154. See generally The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2702
(1994) (prohibiting illegal eaves dropping). The CDA would provide defenses for individuals who take good faith steps to "restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to," a
communication that seems unlawful under its provisions. See Dept. of JusticeLetter, supra
note 105 (citing CDA prior to enactment, S. 652, at § 402(d)(5)). "The defense actually promotes intrusions into private electronic mail by making it 'safer' to monitor private communications than to risk liability. At the same time, this defense would defeat efforts by the
government to enforce federal privacy protection against illegal eavesdropping." Dept. of
Justice Letter, supra note 105.
155. In order to comply with due process standards, a criminal statute must clearly
define what conduct it prohibits and without clarity, the statute is void for vagueness.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968), where the court explains that
[i]t is ... essential that legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly
harmful expression-no less than legislation enacted with respect to adults-be
clearly drawn and that the standards adopted be reasonably precise so that those
who are governed by the law and those that administer it will understand its
meaning and application.
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obscenity and child pornography.' 5 6
C.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION WHICH RESTRICTS THE CONTENT OF
SPEECH TRANSMITTED THROUGH COMPUTER SERVICES WILL

NOT SURVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

1.

The Government Does Not Have a Compelling Interest in
Regulating Computer Speech.

Restrictions attempting to control the content of speech disseminated through Cyberspace will not withstand judicial scrutiny. The constitutionality of an Internet system of self-regulation begins with the
premise that "[alt the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle
that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration and adherence." 15 7 This premise
is buttressed by the Supreme Court's current hesitance to allow blanket
regulation of protected speech.' 5 8 An analysis of the technology-based
rationale which the Supreme Court has used to justify government regulation of protected speech transmitted by traditional communications
media, fails to sustain similar restriction on speech disseminated
through computer communications.
a.

Pervasiveness

First, the First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech because the speech is intrusive unless the "captive" audience cannot avoid the speech's objectionable content. 15 9 Interactive and
on-line information services do not intrude upon the sanctity of an un156. Dept. of Justice Letter,supra note 105. For example, the CDA's definition of"knowingly" would, inter alia, cripple obscenity prosecutions. Dept. of Justice Letter, supra note
105 (citing CDA prior to enactment, S. 652, at § 402(a)). The letter states in relevant part:
Under subsection 402(e), only those persons with "actual knowledge" of the "specific content of the communication" could be held criminally liable. This definition
would make it difficult, if not impossible, to prove guilt, and the standard is higher
than the prevailing knowledge requirements under existing obscenity and child
sexual exploitation statutes. Under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 629 (1973), the
government must only prove that a person being prosecuted under an obscenity
statute had knowledge of the general nature of the material being distributed.
Large-scale distributors of child pornography and other obscene materials... do
not read or view each obscene item they distribute.
Dept. of Justice Letter, supra note 105 (citing S. 652, at § 402(e)).
157. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S.Ct. at 2458 (1994).
158. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129. As the Court recently noted, the "[flirst amendment, subject only to narrow and well understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental
control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals." Turner, 114 S.Ct.
at 2458.
159. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 1983) (citing Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)) (striking down prohibition on mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements).
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willing viewer's home. 1 60 Rather, a user seeking information must affirmatively seek out harmful content by accessing an on-line chat room
discussion or bulletin board service. 16 1 Moreover, computer-based communication services provide the user with alternative methods with
which to evade offensive content. 162 Hence, unlike the television, radio,
or telephone message service, the Internet is not an uninvited guest. Instead, the virtual world must be invited in.
b.

User-control Over the Medium

Second, the First Amendment does not countenance restriction on
protected expression unless the medium is uniquely accessible to children. 163 Hence, if the user of the medium has little control over what a
child sees or hears, the Supreme Court has maintained that the government has a compelling interest in assisting parents in maintaining

authority.

16 4

In this respect, interactive computer services are uniquely different
from the traditional broadcast media and telephone services. For instance, commercial on-line service providers have monitored discussion
160. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844. See also, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (explaining that a justification for regulation of content of speech transmitted via radio is fact
that the unwilling listener is a "captive audience"). In ACLU v. Reno, the court likewise
noted that content transmitted over computer networks does not "invade" an individual's
home to the surprise of the unwilling---or unsuspecting-viewer:
A document's title or a description of the document will usually appear before the
document itself takes the step needed to view it, and in many cases the user will
receive the detailed information about a site's content before he or she need take
the step to access the document. Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded
by warnings as to the content. Even the Government's witness, Agent Howard
Schmidt, Director of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, testified that the
"odds are slim" that a user would come across a sexually explicit site by accident.
Id.
161. 141 Cong. Rec. S9017-02 (daily ed. June 26,.1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley,
Exhibit 1) (noting that graphic Internet sites containing 'binaries" or picture files, require
master codes in Unix computer language or "well chosen clicks of the mouse," and cannot
be retrieved by accident). See also Testimony of Sen. Leahy, supra note 139 (noting that
anyone with a computer and modem can send material through the Internet, but unlike a
broadcaster, potential listeners must seek out this information and download it). The court
in ACLU v. Reno, likewise noted that although a child could receive sexually explicit content by clicking through several HTML links with the mouse, such "receipt requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. 929 F.
Supp. at 845. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve
material and thereby use the Internet unattended." Id.
162. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a. (outlining Internet ratings systems which the
user can use to avoid sexually explicit or offensive Internet sites, screening services offered
by commercial on-line service providers, and user-implemented filtering software).
163. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
164. Id.
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forums.' 6 5 Absent the service provider as intermediary, filtering
software assures users virtually unlimited control over what they choose
to receive, while allowing access to the Internet. 166 Once on the Internet
or World Wide Web, computer screen interfaces, 167 which allow the user
to "talk" to the computer, require the user to affirmatively select an
"endpoint," or ultimate destination, with the click of a mouse or a keyboard command.168 Thus, unlike television or radio, the control over the
medium ultimately resides with the user.16 9 With the variety of usercontrol options, legislation which empowers parents, rather than inhibits
technological development, would further the compelling interest of sup70
porting parents' claim to authority in the home.1
2.

Proposed Legislation Is Not the Least Restrictive Means Available
to Control Objectionable Content

To withstand constitutional scrutiny, regulations which burden the
content of protected speech must be narrowly drawn, without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Legislation which imposes harsh criminal penalties on service providers and users is not the
least restrictive means possible to limit children's access to objectionable
content. Rather, the threat of criminal liability would serve to limit
adult access to protected speech.
Current laws impose liability for illegal speech. 17 1 Likewise, existing technology enables users of interactive services to screen un165. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 WL 323710 at * 5 (noting
that Prodigy's decision to regulate the content of its bulletin boards was in part influenced
by its desire to attract users seeking a "family-oriented" computer service).
166. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.b. (discussing the variety of providers who offer
filtering software).
167. See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1624 (explaining that computer interfaces are the format in which that information is presented to the users and the means by
which the users interact with data).
168. See Berman Statement, supra note 141 (noting that the vast majority of the content
on the Internet is label or identified in some manner, and without such identification, intended users cannot find it). See also, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844-45 (noting that "it
takes several steps to enter Cyberspace", where even at the most fundamental level, the
user must have access to a computer and modem, direct the computer to connect with the
access provider, enter a password, and enter the appropriate commands to find particular
data).
169. See Pacifica,492 U.S. at 749-50 (noting that a factor in justifying broadcast regulation was childrens' accessibility to broadcast coupled with parents' inability to control that
access).
170. Pacifica, 492 U.S. at 748.
171. See discussion supra part III.A.1. (discussing availability of existing laws to prosecute illegal speech on the Internet).
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172
wanted, but protected speech.
Legislation, such as the CDA, attempts to impose upon computer
services laws designed for television, radio, and telephones. 173 The
Supreme Court determined that the broadcast media and common carriers possess the inherent technical capacity to control the flow of content
of expression disseminated through the channel. 17 4 Most computer network operators and content providers, on the other hand, have no practi1 75
cal means of complying broadly worded content-based restrictions.
Thus, when faced with assuming the gargantuan editorial and economic
responsibility necessary to avoid liability, smaller network operators
might be forced out of the market. 1 76 For larger service providers, the
legislature has proposed a conflicting regulatory scheme. Legislation
such as the CDA not only imposes virtually unlimited criminal penalties
but could subject providon providers who abdicate control over content,
1 77
ers who monitor content to liability as well.

Taken to a logical conclusion, heavy-handed content-based legislation will will create a chilling effect on speech disseminated through com172. See discussion supra part III.A.2. (discussing availability of current technology to
screen for objectionable content).
173. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952) (noting that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems). See also ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. at 874 (criticizing the Government's argument in support of the CDA, which
relies on Pacifica, as assuming that "what is good for broadcasting is good for the
Internet").
174. Although the broadcast media have no duty to screen, Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974), the FCC may impose sanctions for indecent broadcast
which ultimately affect the station's license to operate. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. See also
Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1541-42 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1072 (1992) (noting that telephone company requirement of age verification prior to
using indecent audiotext services only means available to prevent children's access).
175. See discussion supra part III.B. (discussing inability of most computer services to
effectively police laws on the Internet); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856 (finding that
defenses provided under the CDA not technologically nor economically feasible for most
providers).
176. See Testimony of Sen. Leahy, supra note 139 (noting that overly restrictive bans
against indecency on the Internet will prove not only unconstitutional but will also hamper
the growth of this new communications medium). As one commentator stated:
If carriers are to be held responsible for the content of all information and communication on their systems, they will be forced to attempt to screen all contentevery e-mail message, text file, word processing document, or image-before it is
allowed to enter the system. In many cases this would simply be impossible. But
even where it would be possible, such prescreening would severely limit the diversity and free flow of information in the on-line world.
See John Markoff, Here Comes the Fiber-opticHome, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1989, at 1 (noting
that the Internet connects and estimated ten million users in over one hundred countries).
177. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 864-65. Those Internet content providers, the
court found, have no clear guidance from the CDA's language as to what actions will guarantee they will be shielded from liability under the CDA. Id.
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puter communications. Hence, such legislation would serve to deny
adult access to constitutionally protected speech. 1 78 Legislation aimed
at controlling the content of computer speech through unlimited criminal
liability is not the least restrictive means that Congress can use to control protected speech on the Internet. Clearly, this is another case of
17 9
"burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."
IV.

CONCLUSION

As one member of the Cyberspace community so aptly stated about
the legislature's current proposal to regulate the Internet, "It's well intentioned but wrong-headed, applying an old broadcast mentality of regulation to an entirely different technology, like the guns of the French
Maginot line on the eve of World War II, pointed in the wrong direction
and irrelevant." 8 0 Clearly, the government is not the right entity to
regulate the content of speech transmitted through computer
communications.
First, blanket content regulation is unnecessary. Existing federal
and state statutes are sufficient to prosecute crime on the Internet, and
existing technology allows parents to block access to offensive content.
Second, legislation which had dubious application to an unlimited
number of users worldwide would likely prove ineffective to administer.
Finally, rationale based on pervasiveness, user control and accessibility
to children which has justified regulation of traditional mass media is
inapplicable to the technology of modern computer communications. Arguably, the State has a compelling interest in protecting children from
indecent or harmful content of information transmitted through computer networks. However, current proposals targeted to obstruct the
free flow of protected information carried through Cyberspace will likely
continue to fail judicial scrutiny. Anything less will reduce the Internet
to a playground fit only for children, transforming "the vast library of the
Internet into a children's reading room, whereby only subjects suitable
178. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down legislation as insufficiently tailored since it denied adults their free speech rights by limiting them to read
only what was acceptable for children). Conversely, as Senator Leahy noted, children may

also be denied access:
If on-line providers are liable for any exposure of indecent material to children,
people under the age of eighteen will be shut out of this technology or relegated by
the government to sanitized "kids only" services that contain only a tiny fraction of
the entire Internet. That would be the equivalent of limiting today's student to
the childhood section of the library or locking them out completely.
Testimony of Sen. Leahy, supra note 139.
179. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
180. Kennedy Maize, Censorship . . . And Stupidity, NEWSBYTES, June 20, 1995, at
NEW06200007.
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for kids could be discussed." 18 '
Dawn L. Johnson

181. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 12, at 38 (statement by Civil Libertarian Mike Godwin, staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, criticizing indecency portion of
Communications Decency Act).

